From Adherence to Authority: A Research Synopsis of the First of Sixty-Six Aspects of the Significance of Hadith al-Thaqalayn in “Abaqat al-Anwar,” in Critique of Abd al-Aziz Dehlavi

Dehlavi declares the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn unrelated to the question of the Imamate and leadership; yet the author of “ʿAbaqāt” confronts him in his very first response with evidence more difficult than a sectarian reading: the understanding of the scholars of his own school. When adherence to the Prophet’s progeny is interpreted in Sunni commentaries as “seeking guidance,” “following as an example,” “following,” “learning,” and “acquiring knowledge,” the claim that it “has no connection whatsoever” is no longer a simple negation; it is a denial that must answer to the apparent meaning of the hadith and to the admissions of its opponents.

Note: This article is a condensed version of a longer article with the same title. To read the original article, use the following link: https://nabaolazim.com/2026/08/%d8%a7%d8%b2-%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b3%da%a9-%d8%aa%d8%a7-%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%ac%d8%b9%db%8c%d8%aa%d8%9b-%d9%88%d8%ac%d9%87-%d9%86%d8%ae%d8%b3%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d8%b2-%d8%b4%d8%b5%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b4%d8%b4/

This essay is an abridged yet comprehensive version of the detailed article on the first of the sixty-six aspects of the evidentiary import of the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn in “ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār.” ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Dehlavī claims that the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn has no connection with the Imāmī claim concerning supreme leadership, since anything to which one adheres is not necessarily the possessor of supreme leadership. Mīr Ḥāmid Ḥusayn Hindī begins his response with the actual meaning of “adherence to the Prophet’s progeny” within the hadith’s particular structure, and then, in order to establish proof conclusively against his opponent, assembles a diverse collection of statements by Sunni scholars. These statements connect adherence to the Prophet’s progeny with concepts such as seeking guidance, following as an example, following, learning, acquiring knowledge, and refraining from opposition. While preserving the main chain of argument, the present article analyzes in condensed form key literary and syntactic examples—especially the statements of al-Taftāzānī, ʿAlī ʿAzīzī, and al-Damanṭī—as well as the connection between the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn and the Hadith of Mawālāt in the transmission of Ḥasan al-Zamān. The result is that they undermine Dehlavī’s claim: in the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn, the Prophet’s progeny are not merely the object of love; within the ummah’s relationship of guidance, they are the object of following and receiving guidance.

Keywords: Hadith of al-Thaqalayn; ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār; ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Dehlavī; Mīr Ḥāmid Ḥusayn Hindī; adherence; following; compelling the opponent; the opponent’s admission; the authority of the Prophet’s Household; Imamate.

At this point, the course of discussion in “ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār” shifts from examining the chains and wordings of the hadith to a semantic dispute. After extensively gathering the various forms of the hadith, the author of “ʿAbaqāt” quotes al-Dihlawī’s denial that the hadith is connected to the Imāmī claim, and then opens the heading “The Author’s Sixty-Six Arguments in Refutation of the Author of Tuḥfa.” This point is important for understanding the project: his response is not a single argument, but a collection of linguistic, grammatical, hadith-based, theological, and polemical approaches, each of which has the capacity for independent study. The first argument is the foundation of this architecture, for before any discussion of the scope of the Imamate, it establishes the meaning of the relationship between the community and the ʿitrah.

An important feature of this argument is its exhaustive method. Mīrzā Ḥāmid Ḥusayn Hindī does not content himself with a single supporting citation; rather, he adduces evidence from hadith scholars, theologians, jurists, men of letters, and commentators on hadith, and even quotes the views of figures known for their opposition to the Imāmīs. From the perspective of research methodology, this approach has particular value: the conclusion does not remain dependent on a selectively chosen piece of evidence, but is tested against “evidence contrary to expectation.” This greatly limits the possibility of reducing the conclusion to a “Shiite personal interpretation.”

The central rule is this: in every respect in which the Qur’an, within the structure of the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things, is the object of the community’s adherence and guidance, the ʿitrah too—by virtue of the conjunction, the dual pronouns, and the shared structure of the negation of misguidance—is included in that same guiding relationship, unless a valid proof is presented for distinguishing between them. The dispute over the limits and implications of this authority begins after the basic apparent meaning has been established, not before it.

In today’s language, al-Dihlawī is saying: from the fact that the community adheres to something or someone, it does not follow that the object of its adherence is the possessor of leadership; therefore, the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things has no connection with the question of the Imamate. The first part of the argument is conceivable in the abstract: not every object of adherence is a “leader” in every usage. But the conclusion al-Dihlawī draws from it goes beyond the premise. From the “absence of a general entailment,” one cannot infer “the irrelevance of this particular case.”

The proper question is not whether “every object of adherence in the world is an imam”; the question is what place the عترت that has been set alongside the Qur’an, adherence to which has been linked to freedom from error, and which the commentators of that same scholarly tradition have interpreted as following and being guided by, occupies in guiding the community. For Dehlawi to establish his absolute negation, he must show that none of the actual indications of the hadith establishes any relation to following and authoritative reference; the first argument of *Abaqat* targets precisely this claim.

“The first point is that: from this noble hadith … it is established that … following the People of the Household … in all religious acts and deeds and in all religious beliefs and legal rulings is obligatory, necessary, incumbent, and imperative …” *Abaqat al-Anwar*, vol. 20, pp. 26–27; PDF: 37–38.

The structure of the argument has two stages. In the first stage, the عترت, alongside the Qur’an, is included within a relationship of guidance; therefore, adherence to it is not a merely emotional or ceremonial relationship. In the second stage, if this following is comprehensive in the sphere of religious guidance, such a status is directly connected with the issue of authoritative reference and leadership. Thus, the author of *Abaqat* does not leap directly from the word “adherence” to “imamate”; the connecting link is the obligation to follow and the guiding authority of the عترت.

The author of *Abaqat* begins the preface to his response in a forceful tone, but at that very point he promises to establish the hadith’s import through “several decisive arguments.” Thus, the forcefulness of the tone is not a substitute for proof; it is a position taken before a broad body of argumentation is presented. The criterion of scholarly judgment is the evidence and arguments that follow.

After stating the claim, the author of *Abaqat* explicitly says that he cites the statements of Sunni scholars “إتماماً للحجة” (“to complete the proof”). Here the rule “الزام الخصم بما التزمه” (“binding the opponent by what he has committed himself to”) comes into play: the opponent need not have accepted the Imami conclusion; it is enough that he accept a premise with which his present denial is inconsistent. Thus, if a Sunni scholar regards holding fast to the Ahl al-Bayt as “following” or as “acquiring knowledge and guidance,” this statement by itself does not establish the entire theory of the Imamate, but the hadith’s guidance-indicating signification can no longer simply be called a “Shi‘i interpretation.”

It is precisely here that the famous expression “الفضل ما شهدت به الأعداء” acquires its polemical value. It is not meant as an independent rule of formal logic, but as a reasonable principle for evaluating evidence: the testimony of someone from whom sectarian alignment with the claim is not expected reduces the likelihood that the result can be explained by bias. In the first aspect, this role is especially clear in the words of Ibn Ruzbahan and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami.

In a few pages, the author of *Abaqat* places twenty-one passages and quotations side by side. To make this section readable and compatible with mobile-phone display in the web version, the evidence is presented in three thematic clusters and in short paragraphs instead of a table. Each paragraph records only the key phrase and its evidentiary function; the complete text, translation, and detailed analysis of each piece of evidence are available in the original article.

1. al-Tibi — *al-Kashif* (743 AH): “محبتهم والاهتداء بهديهم وسيرتهم” — Signification: he places love alongside seeking guidance from and following the conduct of the Ahl al-Bayt; therefore, love does not constitute the entire meaning of holding fast to them.

2. al-Taftazani — Sharh al-Maqasid (792 AH): “Taking from what it contains of knowledge and guidance; and likewise with regard to the Ahl al-Bayt” — Implication: Through the Prophet’s pairing of the two, it extends the same meaning of taking knowledge and guidance from the Qur’an to the Ahl al-Bayt as well.

3. Dawlatabadi — Hidayat al-Suʿada (849 AH): “The one whose following is commanded... and whose imamate is recommended...” — Implication: He connects following to the structure of authority and imamate, highlighting the relationship between the followed and the follower.

4. Husayn Vaʿiz Kashifi (around 910 AH): “Revering... loving and following them” — Implication: He places following alongside reverence and love, as an independent and practical duty.

5. al-Samhudi — Jawahir al-ʿAqdayn (911 AH): “Following the example of, holding fast to, and learning from the Ahl al-Bayt” — Implication: He presents the Ahl al-Bayt simultaneously as a source of learning, an object of adherence, and a model to emulate.

6. Ibn Ruzbihan Khunji (927 AH): “Deserving of reverence and requiring emulation... he commanded emulation of them” — Implication: The explicit acknowledgment by an opponent of the Imami school that emulation is necessary makes it difficult to reduce the hadith to an intra-sectarian interpretation.

7. Ibn Hajar al-Haytami — al-Sawaʿiq al-Muhriqa (974 AH): “Emulation and adherence... and learning from them” — Implication: The triad of emulation, adherence, and learning establishes for the Ahl al-Bayt a status of knowledge and guidance.

8. Kamāl al-Dīn Jahramī — *Barāhīn Qāṭiʿa*: Following and holding fast to the scholars and mystics of Ahl al-Bayt — Implication: It preserves the principle of emulation and explains the exemplar to be followed with a scholarly-guidance qualification.

9. Mullā ʿAlī al-Qārī — *Sharḥ al-Shifāʾ* (1014 AH): «محبتهم ومتابعة سيرتهم» — Implication: He joins love to following their conduct; thus, the relationship with the ʿitrah is not merely emotional.

10. al-Manāwī — *Fayḍ al-Qadīr* (1031 AH): «اهتديتم بهدي عترتي واقتديتم بسيرتهم» — Implication: He makes the negation of misguidance dependent on being guided by and emulating the ʿitrah.

11. al-Manāwī — *al-Taysīr*: «عملتم بالقرآن واهتديتم بهدي عترتي العلماء» — Implication: He places acting upon the Qur’an and being guided by the ʿitrah together within a single guidance-oriented, outcome-producing structure.

12. Khafājī — *Nasīm al-Riyāḍ* (1069 AH): «عملكم بكتاب الله واتباعكم لأهل بيتي» — Implication: He explains the community’s duty toward the two weighty trusts through the two expressions “acting upon the Book” and “following Ahl al-Bayt.”

13. ʿAlī ʿAzīzī — al-Sirāj al-Munīr (1070 AH): «وعترتي، عطف على كتاب الله... لا تخالفوهما» — Implication: The conjunction and dual pronoun keep the Qur’an and the progeny within a single syntactic construction, and at the end prohibit مخالفة both of them.

14. al-Zurqānī — Sharḥ al-Mawāhib al-Ladunniyya (1122 AH): «هل تتبعونهما» — Implication: He attributes following to both of the two weighty things by means of the dual pronoun.

15. al-Zurqānī — the same work: «أمّا الاقتداء فإنما يكون بالعلماء العاملين منهم» — Implication: He distinguishes between general benevolence toward the People of the House and scholarly emulation of their learned practitioners; this qualification does not eliminate the principle of emulation.

16. Muḥammad Bādkhashī — Miftāḥ al-Najā: «الاقتداء والتمسك بهما» — Implication: He explicitly attributes emulation and adherence to both of the two weighty things by means of the dual pronoun.

17. Walī Allāh Lakhnawī — Mirʾāt al-Muʾminīn (1270 AH): «اقتدا و تمسک و تعلم از ایشان» — Implication: He independently repeats the same threefold conception of scholarly and practical authority.

18. ʿAlī b. Sulaymān al-Damantī — Nafʿ Qūt al-Mughtadhī (1306 AH): «اهتديتم بهداهم وسيرتهم... كتوأمين خليفتين» — Implication: The conditional construction places guidance through the Prophet’s progeny and the likening of the two weighty things to two interconnected successors side by side.

19. Ḥasan al-Zamān — Qawl Mustaḥsan: «الحث على متابعة الثقلين بعد حديث الموالاة» — Implication: The commentator himself understands following the two weighty things as an extension of the hadith of allegiance; therefore, the connection between the two sections is not merely a construction imposed by external analysis.

20. Ḥasan al-Zamān — Multiple Chains: Following the two weighty things alongside «من كنت وليه فهذا وليه» — Implication: The repetition of this connection across several chains reduces the likelihood that a single context is exceptional.

21. Ḥasan al-Zamān — Evidence from the Purification, ʿArafah, and Ghadīr: Identifying the Ahl al-Bayt and repeating the call to follow them — Implication: The variety of settings reinforces both the identity of the Prophet’s progeny and the repetition of their guiding role.

“Do you not see that he, peace and blessings be upon him, coupled them with the Book of God Almighty … There is no meaning to holding fast to the Book except taking from it knowledge and guidance; and likewise with regard to the Ahl al-Bayt.” ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār, vol. 20, p. 27; PDF: 38.

Taftazānī does not merely report the conclusion; he also demonstrates the path of inference. “قرنهم بكتاب الله” takes the pairing of the Ahl al-Bayt with the Qur’an as the source of the indication; “بهما” makes both of them the object of the salvific holding fast that prevents misguidance; and “لا معنى... إلا” restricts the meaning of holding fast to the Book to acquiring knowledge and guidance. He then transfers the same semantic ruling to the Ahl al-Bayt through “فكذا في العترة”. This passage is among the strongest pieces of evidence that the Ahl al-Bayt’s sharing with the Qur’an in their guiding relation is not merely a construction produced by the exposition of the author of ʿAbaqāt.

“Indeed, I am leaving among you two successors: the Book of God … and my Ahl al-Bayt; [‘and my Ahl al-Bayt’ is] coordinated with ‘the Book of God’ … that is, I urge you to follow them; do not oppose the two.” ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār, vol. 20, p. 29; PDF: 40.

In ʿAzīzī’s analysis, “خليفتين” is a dual designation for two referents; “كتاب الله” is its بدل or explanatory apposition, and “عترتي,” as he explicitly states, is coordinated with “كتاب الله”. Coordination alone does not establish equality between the Qur’an and the Ahl al-Bayt in every attribute, but it does not remove the coordinated element from the shared syntactic ruling without contextual evidence. The end of the commentary is also clear: “أحثكم على اتباعهم” and then “لا تخالفوهما”. The dual pronoun “هما” once again gathers the Book and the Ahl al-Bayt under a single prohibition against مخالفتهم. Therefore, the syntax of the hadith limits the possibility of turning the Ahl al-Bayt into an object that is merely emotional.

“Mā is a relative pronoun, and the conditional sentence is its relative clause… and you loved my progeny, followed their guidance, and adopted their conduct; in this there is an indication that the two are like twin successors to the Messenger of God…” ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār, vol. 20, p. 30; PDF: 41.

Damanati considers “mā” a relative pronoun and the conditional sentence its relative clause; consequently, “holding fast” is placed within a syntactic structure whose result is the absence of misguidance. He also points to the narration’s use of “akhdh­tum” instead of “tamas­saktum,” which strengthens the semantic field of taking hold and adherence. Regarding the progeny, he does not leave love by itself, but adds “you followed their guidance and conduct” to it. Finally, the Qur’an and the progeny are likened, through the dual pronoun “annāhumā,” to “two twins and two successors.” The minimum implication of this expression is the continuation of the guiding role of the two weighty things after the Prophet, not necessarily their equality in all respects.

“Indeed, God is my Master, and I am the master of the believers, and I have greater authority over them than they have over themselves. So whoever’s master I am, this is his master… Then he said… and I shall ask you… about the two weighty things… In it there is an exhortation to follow the two weighty things after the hadith of allegiance.” ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār, vol. 20, pp. 30–31; PDF: 41–42.

The importance of this evidence lies not merely in the juxtaposition of the two hadiths. Before “Whoever’s master I am” comes the expression “I have greater authority over them than they have over themselves”; then Ali’s authority is proclaimed, and immediately afterward the community’s responsibility toward the two weighty things is raised. Hasan al-Zaman himself calls this sequence “following the two weighty things after the hadith of allegiance.” In addition, other transmission routes also report this same connection between following the two weighty things and Ali’s authority. These indications alone do not resolve all the details of immediate succession, but they do not allow us to reduce the whole complex to “mere love” and then speak of a complete lack of connection with leadership.

The strength of the first line of argument does not lie merely in the “abundance of transmission.” Several features transform the multiplication of evidence into meaningful induction: the diversity of the speakers’ fields of scholarship; the independent repetition of concepts such as guidance, following, learning, and adherence; the presence of well-known opponents of the Imāmī school; and the preservation of the qualifications attached to their statements. For example, where Zarqānī or Jārhamī restrict adherence to the learned and practicing members of the Ahl al-Bayt, the author of *ʿAbaqāt* transmits this qualification as well. This method is important from the perspective of critical thinking, because instead of constructing an “admission exceeding the text,” it uses precisely the amount of acceptance granted by the opponent to assess Dehlavī’s claim.

Accordingly, the appropriate expression for the method of this line of argument is “maximal exhaustive investigation and broad within-case induction”: not in the sense of enumerating all Sunni scholars in every period, but in the sense that, within the scope of a specific issue, the evidence has become so diverse that the conclusion no longer depends on one or two selectively chosen transmissions.

Dehlavī could have said: “I do not infer all the theoretical implications of the Imāmī doctrine of the Imamate from the obligation to follow the عترة,” and then discussed the entailment. But his statement goes a very significant step further and denies the very connection between the hadith and the claim. The first line of argument of the author of *ʿAbaqāt* breaks this blanket denial. When Ṭībī speaks of guidance, al-Taftāzānī of acquiring knowledge and guidance, Dawlatābādī of following and the Imamate, Ibn Rūzbihān of adherence, Ibn Ḥajar of adherence and learning, Khafājī of following, ʿAzīzī of conjunction and non-opposition, Dimantī of guidance and a conditional construction, and Ḥasan al-Zamān of following the Two Weighty Things after professing loyalty, it can no longer be said that the hadith has no relationship whatsoever to the authority of the Ahl al-Bayt.

The precise conclusion of this line of argument is not the instantaneous proof of every component of the theory of the Imamate; it is a more limited but firmer conclusion: in the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things, the عترة is not merely the object of love and respect; rather, in the ummah’s relation to guidance, it is the object of following, adherence, and receiving guidance. From this point onward, the dispute may continue over the scope and implications of this authority; but the starting point of the discussion is no longer “the absence of any relationship whatsoever.”

This text is a research abridgment of the original article and deliberately condenses some of the biographical details, the complete text of all twenty-one evidences, the full translations, the extensive syntactic and morphological analyses, and the detailed examination of the inductive method of the author of <i>ʿAbaqāt</i>. For a documented and complete study of each evidence and a tracing of all the details of the argument, consult the original, detailed version of the article, “From Appeal to Authority: The First Aspect among the Sixty-Six Aspects of the Evidentiary Import of the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn in <i>ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār</i> in Critique of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dihlawī.”

Mīr Ḥāmid Ḥusayn Hindī, <i>ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār fī Imāmat al-Aʾimma al-Aṭhār</i>, vol. 20, the opening section on the sixty-six aspects, especially pp. 26–31 (PDF: 37–42).