From “Following” to the Authoritative Status and Imamate of the ʿItra: A Scholarly Analysis of the Seventh of Sixty-Six Aspects of the Evidentiary Significance of Hadith al-Thaqalayn in ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār and a Critique of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Dihlawī’s Claim
Author: Hamed Sarem
Abstract:
1. Introduction: From the Dispute over “Adherence” to the Explicit Text on “Following”
In the argumentative structure of ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār, the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn is not merely a statement of the virtues of the Ahl al-Bayt; rather, it is a guidance-oriented and normative text that formulates the relationship of the community after the Prophet with the two remaining authorities. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dihlawī, responding to the Imāmī argument, seeks to create a distance between the Prophetic recommendation concerning the Qur’an and the ʿitrah and the claim of the Imamate. In other words, he accepts the mere mention of the ʿitrah, or even the necessity of observing their rights, but does not infer from this their leadership and binding authority. In ʿAbaqāt, Mīr Ḥāmid Ḥusayn criticizes this distancing from several angles. The seventh aspect is one of the most concise and, at the same time, most important links in this critique, because in it the verb “following” itself appears in the text of the tradition, and it is no longer necessary to establish the principle of following through the semantic extension of words such as “adherence” or “taking.”
The scholarly significance of this aspect lies in bringing the dispute from the level of remote indications and possible entailments to the level of the sentence’s explicit structure. If the Noble Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him and his family, said, “You will never go astray if you follow them both,” the primary question is no longer whether the community has an obligation toward the ʿitrah; rather, one must ask what kind of relationship “following” establishes in this context, what its scope is, what relation it bears to the authority of the ʿitrah’s words and actions, and whether one may infer the Imamate from it. This article examines precisely this chain step by step and avoids transforming a hadith-based premise into a theological conclusion without explaining the intermediate links.
2. The Problem, Questions, and Research Method
The central problem of the study is this: In Mīr Ḥāmid Ḥusayn’s argumentative logic, does the version “إن اتبعتموهما” of the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn merely indicate the virtue of following the Ahl al-Bayt, or does it establish a kind of binding authority and reference that necessarily entails religious Imamate? To answer this, four subsidiary questions must be distinguished: First, in which sources has this wording been reported, and what is the assessment of its chain by hadith scholars? Second, what element does “following,” in terms of language and religious usage, contain beyond love and veneration? Third, what logical relationship between following and guidance does the expression “لن تضلوا إن اتبعتموهما” establish? Fourth, what theological premises does the transition from the authority of the ʿitrah to the Imamate require, and where is its limit?
The research method is textual analysis and argumentation. The base text is the seventh argument on pages 69–71 of the edition used of the section on signification (dalāla) in ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār. To assess the wording from the perspective of hadith criticism, primary sources such as al-Mustadrak ʿalā al-Ṣaḥīḥayn and Tārīkh Dimashq, together with Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī’s account in al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Muḥriqa, are examined; for lexical analysis, classical Arabic-language sources such as Lisān al-ʿArab are consulted. The aim is not to add a body of external evidence in place of the argument in ʿAbaqāt, but to clarify the implicit premises, strengths, limits, and points open to dispute within that same argument.
3. The Central Text of the Seventh Argument and the Structure of the Reasoning
The central text cited is the narration of Zayd ibn Arqam, which al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī records in al-Mustadrak in the following wording:
In the same account, following this sentence, the Prophet asks his audience: “أتعلمون أني أولى بالمؤمنين من أنفسهم؟” (“Do you know that I have a greater claim over the believers than they have over themselves?”), and then states: “من كنت مولاه فعلي مولاه” (“Whoever has me as his mawlā has ʿAlī as his mawlā”). This very textual continuity, which will be analyzed separately later, is particularly significant, because the version containing “following” (ittibāʿ) is not transmitted in a neutral context concerned merely with the merit of the Ahl al-Bayt; rather, it occurs in an address in which the Prophet’s greater claim over the believers and the walāya of ʿAlī, peace be upon him, are also present.
The reasoning of the seventh argument can be reconstructed in three steps: (a) the Prophet directed the community to follow the Qurʾan and the ʿitra; (b) following upon which freedom from misguidance is made contingent entails the binding authority and fitness to guide of that which is followed; (c) within the Imāmī theological system, the comprehensive guiding authority of the ʿitra is among the principal prerogatives of the imamate. The scholarly value of the article becomes apparent when each of these three steps is established separately.
4. Hadith-Critical Assessment of the Wording “إن اتبعتموهما” (“If You Follow Them Both”)
4–1. The Accounts of al-Hakim and Ibn ʿAsakir
The well-known transmission route for this wording in al-Mustadrak relates it from Zayd ibn Arqam through Abu al-Tufayl ʿAmir ibn Wathila and Salama ibn Kuhayl. Ibn ʿAsakir also includes the same substance in Tarikh Dimashq, recording the expression «إذا اتبعتموهما» (“if you follow them both”). The presence of this account in two important hadith-historical works shows that ittibaʿ (“following”) is not a later inference from the concept of tamassuk (“holding fast”); rather, it has been transmitted in the hadith tradition as an independently attested wording. This point is fundamental to the seventh argument: Mir Hamid Husayn’s reasoning is not founded on a linguistic possibility, but rests on a transmitted version of the hadith’s text.
4–2. Al-Hakim’s Authentication and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami’s Account
In the context of these same narrations, al-Hakim judged the hadith to be “authentic according to the criteria of the two Shaykhs” and adduced it as corroboration for the principal narration. Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, too, after discussing the transmission routes of the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things, introduces the wording «إني تارك فيكم أمرين لن تضلوا إن اتبعتموهما…» (“I am leaving among you two things; you will not go astray if you follow them both…”) with the phrase «وفي رواية صحيحة» (“and in an authentic narration”). Within the argumentative framework of ʿAbaqat, such authentication carries added importance, because the author seeks to argue on premises accepted within the Sunni hadith tradition, rather than relying solely on sources internal to his own denomination.
4–3. The Debate over Muhammad ibn Salama ibn Kuhayl in Narrator Criticism
Nevertheless, precision in hadith scholarship requires distinguishing between al-Hakim’s authentication and the standing of each individual narrator in the transmission route. In this chain, Muhammad ibn Salama ibn Kuhayl is a subject of debate. Assessments such as “weak” or «ليس بشيء» (“of no account”) have been transmitted from Yahya ibn Maʿin concerning him, and Ibn ʿAdi also cites objectionable (munkar) hadiths transmitted by him. By contrast, Ibn Hibban includes him in al-Thiqat, and Abu Hazim/Abu Hatim ranks him above his brother Yahya. In his critical response to al-Hakim’s authentication, Ibn al-Mulaqqin explicitly states that Muhammad ibn Salama is not among the narrators of the two Shaykhs and that al-Juzajani judged him weak. Among contemporary assessments, Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾut has likewise judged the chain transmitting this particular wording to be weak.
This disagreement has an important methodological consequence: in a scholarly article, the mere presence of the phrase “صحيح على شرط الشيخين” (“authentic according to the criteria of the two Shaykhs”) cannot be regarded as bringing discussion of the chain of transmission to a close. On the other hand, judging a narrator to be weak does not amount to the collapse of the entire body of the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things (Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn), since the subject of this dispute is the particular transmission route containing the wording “following” (ittibāʿ), rather than the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things itself in all its transmission routes and wordings. Two propositions must therefore be kept separate: “The Hadith of the Two Weighty Things itself enjoys extensive support in transmitted reports,” and “This particular textual version is disputed with regard to its chain of transmission.” The seventh argument depends directly on the second proposition, and its probative force increases on the basis of accepting this version, or at least accepting its suitability for citation as supporting evidence.
4–4. The Probative Value of the Wording When the Chain of Transmission Is Disputed
Even if a critic does not independently consider the transmission route through Muḥammad ibn Salama to attain the rank of “authentic” (ṣaḥīḥ), this wording retains two levels of value. First, its value as “semantic corroboration”: this version shows that, within part of the transmission tradition, hadith scholars understood and transmitted the relationship among the Qur’an, the Prophet’s progeny (ʿitra), and freedom from misguidance through the explicit term “following” (ittibāʿ). Second, its value as “argumentation on the opponent’s premises”: when a scholar such as Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī—who himself writes in a context of criticism of Shiism—speaks of an “authentic report,” Mīr Ḥāmid Ḥusayn can rely on that very authentication in debate. From the standpoint of independent research, of course, this does not replace an examination of the narrators; rather, it illustrates the distinction between “authority in debate” and “independent hadith authority.”
5. A Lexical Analysis of “Following” (Ittibāʿ): From Moving Behind Another to Practical Commitment
In Arabic lexical sources, the root t-b-ʿ denotes “proceeding in someone’s footsteps and following.” Ibn Manẓūr writes in Lisān al-ʿArab: “تَبِعَ الشيءَ… سِرتُ في أثره” (“He followed the thing … I proceeded in its footsteps”), and, for “اتّبعه” (“he followed him”), he also mentions the meanings of going behind, pursuing, and accompanying. Thus, the semantic core of following is not merely knowledge, love, or respect; it is a kind of practical orientation in which the follower aligns his own movement with the course of the one followed. In religious usage, this same component extends to accepting the path, ruling, and guidance of the one followed.
In the Qur’an, too, “following” is frequently used to identify an authority and a path: “اتَّبِعُوا ما أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْكُمْ مِنْ رَبِّكُمْ” (“Follow what has been sent down to you from your Lord”; al-Aʿrāf: 3), “وَاتَّبِعُوهُ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَهْتَدُونَ” (“And follow him, so that you may be guided”; al-Aʿrāf: 158), and “فَاتَّبِعُونِي يُحْبِبْكُمُ اللَّهُ” (“Then follow me; Allah will love you”; Āl ʿImrān: 31). In these usages, following is associated with “guidance,” “compliance,” and “setting oneself on the path.” Therefore, if this same word is used of “كتاب الله” (“the Book of Allah”) and “أهل بيتي عترتي” (“the people of my household, my progeny”) within a single construction, the initial presumption is that both have been presented as authorities that provide direction, unless there is contextual evidence for narrowing the meaning of following specifically with respect to the progeny.
The more precise point is that following (ittibāʿ) is distinct from, yet overlaps with, “obedience” (ṭāʿah). Obedience focuses on compliance with a command; following is broader and may also encompass adherence to statements, methods, explanations, and conduct. Consequently, the import of “following the ʿItrah” is not necessarily confined to cases in which they have issued an explicit command; if the ʿItrah has been presented as an authority for guidance, their understanding and method also become objects of adherence. It is this semantic breadth that explains the connection between following and religious authority.
6. Syntactic Analysis: The Dual Pronoun and the Single Ruling Applied to the Qur’an and the ʿItrah
One of the most important points of the seventh line of argument lies in the linguistic analysis of the sentence. The verb “اتبعتموهما” (“you follow them both”) contains a dual object pronoun, whose referents are the two entities explicitly mentioned after it: “كتاب الله” (“the Book of God”) and “أهل بيتي عترتي” (“the people of my household, my ʿItrah”). This construction brings both objects under a single ruling. Semantically, one cannot, without a contextual indication, claim that “following” means adherence in understanding and practice with respect to the Qur’an, but merely love or veneration with respect to the ʿItrah; the verb and pronoun are the same, and the sentence provides no marker distinguishing the nature of the relationship in the two cases.
The addressee is commanded to follow both. The argument of the seventh line of reasoning rests on “sharing the ruling of being followed” and on “the complete equivalence of the two weighty things” in the matter of guidance.
7. “لن تضلوا” (“You Will Not Go Astray”): A Condition That Establishes a Consequence and Makes Following a Matter of Guidance
Even if the hadith had said only “اتبعوا كتاب الله وأهل بيتي” (“Follow the Book of God and the people of my household”), it would still convey the obligation or preferability of following; however, the addition of “لن تضلوا” (“you will not go astray”) greatly increases its theological significance. The sentence establishes a consequential relationship between following and not going astray: “If you follow them both, you will not go astray.” In such a construction, the ʿItrah is not merely the object of a moral virtue, but is presented as part of the mechanism that safeguards the community against misguidance.
“Going astray” in this context is a religious and epistemic concept. Immunity from going astray means maintaining the correct course in religious belief, understanding, and practice. Accordingly, that which produces such an effect when followed must possess epistemic competence and the capacity to guide. If a person or group lacks authority as a source of guidance, following that person or group cannot, in general terms, be regarded as a means of avoiding error. From this emerges the first theological implication: in this hadith, the Prophet’s progeny constitute an “authoritative source of guidance”; that is, within the logic of the hadith, their statements and religious orientations cannot be considered devoid of authority or merely personal.
Within the framework of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), the wording of the hadith can be analyzed in terms of a condition and its consequent: the condition is “following both,” and the consequent is “not going astray.” The more broadly the unrestricted scope of the condition is understood, the broader the scope of the progeny’s authority will be. If following were intended only within a limited domain—for example, familial affection—there would have to be contextual evidence for this restriction, whereas the sentence itself, through the word “going astray,” foregrounds the domain of religious guidance.
8. Does “Following” in the Hadith Indicate Obligation?
In terms of its grammatical form, the wording of the report, «لن تضلوا إن اتبعتموهما» (“You will never go astray if you follow them both”), is not the direct imperative «اتبعوا» (“Follow”), but a conditional proposition. Thus, attributing “obligation” solely to the grammatical form of the verb in the conditional clause requires explanation. The more sound approach is to infer obligation from the purpose of the statement and the context in which it is made: in identifying the way to prevent the community from going astray, the Prophet presents following the Qur’an and his progeny as the criterion. If safeguarding oneself against religious error is obligatory and falling into error is prohibited, then taking the path that the Lawgiver has identified as the means of protection acquires obligatory force, at least in cases where guidance is mandatory.
The precise argument, then, is not that “the verb «اتبعتم» (‘you followed’)” is inherently an imperative form indicating obligation; rather, it is that the Prophet’s report concerning the necessary relationship between following and guidance creates a practical obligation, given the obligation to attain guidance and avoid going astray. Thus, Mīr Ḥāmid Ḥusayn effectively relies on the “necessity of following”; its formulation in legal theory is derived from the combined meaning, context, and purpose of the hadith.
9. The Unrestricted Scope of Following and the Extent of the Progeny’s Authority
The next question is whether the intended following is unrestricted or limited. The text of the report contains no qualification such as “in love,” “in ethics,” or “in certain rulings.” The object of following is likewise expressed through the general designation “my Household, my progeny” («أهل بيتي عترتي»), and the outcome is “not going astray.” In the absence of contextual evidence, the principle of apparent meaning is more consistent with an unrestricted reading. This unrestricted scope does not mean that every personal act of everyone related to the Prophet is authoritative without any criteria whatsoever; rather, it means that the designation of the progeny presented in the hadith as the counterpart of the Quran and a source of guidance calls for adherence within the domain of religious guidance.
At this point, a distinction must be drawn between “the designation of the progeny” and “every individual genealogically descended from Banu Hashim.” Drawing on the lexical extension of “progeny” to relatives, Dihlawi raises the objection of multiplicity and even contradiction: if all relatives are to be followed, how are their disagreements to be resolved? The answer, drawn from the hadith’s own structure, is that the progeny who are the object of following are identified by the attributes specified in the hadith itself: namely, those whose association with the Book and the following of whom guarantee that one will not go astray. Thus, one cannot first extend the scope of the progeny to every relative and then use their possible disagreements against the hadith. The hadith itself imposes a guidance-related qualification on those to whom the designation applies. Of course, precisely identifying the individuals to whom this designation applies is a separate question and requires texts identifying the Ahl al-Bayt and the Imams.
10. From Following to Authoritativeness: The Intermediate Link in the Theological Argument
The most important link left unstated in many polemical formulations is the transition from “following” to “authoritativeness.” Why does a command to follow establish authoritativeness? Because obligatory religious adherence to an authority is not rationally coherent without the epistemic validity of that authority’s words and deeds. If the Lawgiver tells the morally responsible person to follow an authority on the path of guidance, yet at the same time allows the possibility that this authority, within the very domain in which it is to be followed, might bind people to falsehood, a conflict arises between the institution of adherence and the purpose of guidance. Thus, the very institution of an authority for guidance confers a form of religiously sanctioned validity upon the one to be followed.
In the hadith under discussion, this authoritativeness is reinforced in two respects: first, the progeny are placed alongside the Book of God in a single sentence and governed by a single verb; second, the outcome of following is “not going astray.” Accordingly, the authoritativeness intended here is not merely that of a transmitter’s report or a jurist’s fatwa; the discussion concerns an authority whose path is regarded as part of the overarching criterion for the community’s guidance. In theological terminology, such authoritativeness is very close to “religious authority.”
11. From Authoritativeness to Imamate: The Necessary Implication and Its Limits
The next step moves from the authoritative status of the ʿitra to “imamate.” This transition is valid only if we do not restrict imamate to political rule in the narrowly executive sense. In Imami theology, in addition to leading the community, the Imam is an authoritative reference for explaining the Sharia and providing religious guidance. If the hadith places the ʿitra after the Prophet in a position such that following them alongside the Quran is a condition for not going astray, it establishes one of the most fundamental functions of imamate. In this respect, the seventh aspect strongly indicates “religious imamate” or “post-Prophetic religious authority.”
Scholarly precision, however, requires that the conclusion not extend beyond the premises. The wording “اتبعتموهما” (“you follow them both”) does not, by itself, name the twelve Imams, specify their historical succession, or independently set out all the details of the theory of divine designation. What this aspect establishes more directly is the principle that the ʿitra possesses binding authority alongside the Quran. To identify the first person who holds this authority, the succession of the Imams, and the other dimensions of the theory of imamate, one must refer to other texts, such as the Hadith of Ghadir, the Hadith of Position (Manzila), the texts concerning the Twelve Imams, and the reports identifying the Ahl al-Bayt. This delimitation does not diminish the value of the seventh aspect; rather, it precisely identifies the actual scope of its indication.
12. Indication of Infallibility: A Direct Conclusion or a Conditional Implication?
One of the conclusions drawn from the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things in Imami theology is the infallibility of the ʿitra. With respect to the seventh aspect, the argument is formulated as follows: if following the ʿitra, together with the Quran, unconditionally prevents misguidance, then supposing that they could issue erroneous guidance that one is obliged to follow would be incompatible with the guarantee “لن تضلوا” (“you will never go astray”). Thus, within the domain in which following them has been established as the criterion of guidance, immunity from error that leads astray necessarily follows.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between “infallibility in the capacity of providing guidance” and all the broader philosophical or theological formulations of infallibility. The hadith primarily demonstrates that the guidance of the ʿitra is incompatible with misguidance. Developing this into a comprehensive theory of infallibility from every sin, lapse, or error requires supplementary premises. Accordingly, the seventh aspect provides, at a minimum, a strong basis for epistemic infallibility in matters of guidance; extending it to every domain must be supported by other evidence.
13. The Report’s Connection with “أولى بالمؤمنين” (“Having Greater Authority over the Believers”) and the Hadith of Ghadir
One of the most important hadith-related and theological points in Zayd ibn Arqam’s version is that the wording concerning the Two Weighty Things is connected, within the same report, to the question “أتعلمون أني أولى بالمؤمنين من أنفسهم؟” (“Do you know that I have a greater claim over the believers than they have over themselves?”), followed by the statement “من كنت مولاه فعلي مولاه” (“Whoever has me as his mawlā has Ali as his mawlā”). This proximity is important for understanding the context in which the statement was delivered. In such a complete transmission, the hadith moves from the authority of the Two Weighty Things to the question of the Prophet’s greater claim and the walāya of Ali, peace be upon him. Consequently, the claim that the statement concerning the Two Weighty Things has no connection to leadership and the imamate becomes more difficult to sustain in light of the full context of this version.
This connection should not, without additional argument, lead to the conclusion that every component of the statement is exactly synonymous with another: “following the Prophet’s progeny,” “the Prophet’s greater claim,” and “Ali’s status as mawlā” are distinct concepts. Their juxtaposition within a single address nevertheless indicates that the report’s conceptual framework is organized around “guiding authority and walāya after the Prophet.” The seventh argument draws on this context as corroborating evidence: when “following” appears alongside the “greater claim” and “status as mawlā,” interpreting it as mere familial affection or moral virtue becomes highly implausible.
14. A Critique of Dihlawi’s Reductionist Formulation: “Love” Does Not Replace “Following”
One way of neutralizing the implications of the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things is to reduce the rights of the Prophet’s progeny to loving and respecting them and observing their sanctity. This interpretation is consistent with certain established Islamic teachings concerning affection for the Ahl al-Bayt, but it is insufficient to explain the phrase “إن اتبعتموهما” (“if you follow them both”). Love is an inward and ethical disposition; following establishes a normative and practical relationship between the “follower” and “the one followed.” Someone may love a person without following that person’s views and ways; these two concepts are therefore not equivalent.
In addition to this conceptual difference, “لن تضلوا” (“you will never go astray”) also provides evidence against a purely emotional interpretation. In religious tradition, protection from misguidance is connected to recognizing the truth and adhering to the correct path. If the Prophet identifies “following” two authorities as the way to avoid misguidance, recasting this as “merely loving” requires strong contextual evidence that is absent from the text. The seventh argument therefore correctly shifts the point of contention from “the obligation to love the Ahl al-Bayt”—which may be a matter of agreement—to “the necessity of following them for guidance.”
15. The Objection Concerning the Inclusion of All Relatives and the Conceptual Response
Another objection found in Dehlavi’s writings is that if “ʿitrah” means relatives, and following the ʿitrah indicates imamate, then all of the Prophet’s relatives must be imams. This objection holds if “ʿitrah” in the hadith is understood merely as an unrestricted genealogical designation. The text of the hadith, however, defines the ʿitrah by a particular role: they are paired with the Book, and following them guarantees freedom from misguidance. Thus, the aforementioned guiding characteristic itself provides a contextual indication that restricts the intended referents.
From a logical standpoint, the general lexical meaning of a designation cannot be used to include referents that are incompatible with the predicates of the sentence itself. If one of the Prophet’s relatives commits a manifest error in guidance, that very fact shows that this person is not a referent of the “ʿitrah” whose following is presented in the hadith as guaranteeing freedom from misguidance. This response, of course, only rebuts the objection concerning “all relatives”; positively identifying the referents of the guiding ʿitrah still requires independent evidence.
16. Comparison with Reports on the Merits of Other Companions: The Difference in Evidentiary Structure
To diminish the distinctiveness of the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things (al-Thaqalayn), Dehlavi cites reports in which other Companions are praised or recourse to them for knowledge is recommended. Even if disputes over the chains of transmission of each of those reports are set aside, the analogy remains incomplete, because the seventh argument rests on a “combination of indications,” not merely an act of directing people toward someone. In this combination, the ʿitrah is placed alongside the Book of God, the dual pronoun brings both under a single ruling, freedom from misguidance is made consequent upon following them, and, in this very version, the discourse is connected to the Prophet’s priority of authority and ʿAli’s status as mawlā.
Thus, to refute the argument, merely finding a report that says “Take knowledge from such-and-such a Companion” is insufficient; a report must be presented that is on an equal footing in terms of unrestricted scope, the guarantee of guidance, being paired with the Qur’an, and the context of wilāyah. If those elements are absent, verbal resemblance cannot substitute for similarity in evidentiary force. This distinction is one of the most important points that should be highlighted in a scholarly assessment of the debate.
17. Does Following the ʿItrah Also Establish Political Leadership?
Here, two levels of imamate must be distinguished. The first is “religious authority”: the right to elucidate, guide, and be followed by the community in matters of religion. The seventh line of argument points more directly to this level. The second is “political leadership and the right to exercise governmental authority.” To move from the first level to the second, one may argue that, in the Prophetic theory of leadership, ultimate religious authority and general authority over the community are inseparable, especially since this same narration is connected to “having a greater claim over the believers than they have over themselves” and “Whoever has me as his master, ʿAlī is his master.” Nevertheless, this step depends more on the full context of the hadith and the theoretical foundations of imamate than on the word “following” itself.
Thus, the most precise formulation is that the seventh line of argument independently establishes “binding authority in guidance,” thereby proving one of the pillars of imamate. To establish political authority in its full sense, it must be said that no one can deny the Qurʾan’s political caliphate, and that, according to this narration, the Prophet’s progeny constitute a weighty trust alongside the Qurʾan, and departing from them is impermissible in all matters, including political affairs.
18. An Uṣūl-Based Formulation of the Seventh Line of Argument
To clarify the structure of the argument, it can be reformulated as a series of connected premises:
- The Prophet, in the narration cited, presents the Qurʾan and his progeny as two things left behind for the community.
- The single verb “you follow them both” makes both the objects of following; thus, the community’s fundamental duty toward both is “following.”
- • Not going astray is tied to following both; therefore, the ʿitrah possesses competence and authority in the sphere of religious guidance.
- • Binding competence to guide entails authoritative validity and religious authority, because obligatory adherence to an authority that lacks authoritative validity is incompatible with the purpose of guidance.
- • Religious authority after the Messenger of God is among the fundamental functions of the Imam; consequently, the hadith supports the principle of the religious imamate of the ʿitrah.
- • Identifying the person or persons who qualify for this designation and establishing the other functions of the imamate require supplementary contextual evidence and explicit texts.
The advantage of this formulation is that it precisely identifies the point of contention. A critic may dispute the chain of transmission supporting the wording “following,” its unrestricted scope, the necessary connection between following and authoritative validity, or the necessary connection between authoritative validity and imamate; however, the critic can no longer issue a blanket denial that the hadith has any connection to imamate. At a minimum, the seventh line of argument shows that the text lies at the heart of the question of “the authority whom the community is to follow,” and this question inherently belongs to discussions of imamate and authority after the Prophet.
19. The Analytical Innovation of the Seventh Line of Argument: Distinguishing Three Levels of Signification
For a precise evaluation of the seventh aspect, three levels of signification must be distinguished from one another. The first level is “lexical signification”: the ʿitrah is the object of following. This level is established by the text of the narration. The second level is “principial-guidational signification”: following that guarantees the avoidance of misguidance brings with it authority and reference status. This level requires a rational analysis of the relationship between the establishment of following and the اعتبار of a reference. The third level is “theological signification”: comprehensive guidational authority is one of the functions of the imamate. This level rests on the definition of the imamate and its relation to the exposition of the Sharīʿah.
Many misunderstandings arise when these three levels are conflated. An opponent may say, “The word ‘Imam’ does not occur in the hadith,” and conclude that the hadith does not indicate the imamate; whereas the argument of ʿAbaqāt does not claim a direct, corresponding signification of the word “Imam,” but reaches the imamate through the implication of the meaning of following and authority. Conversely, the defender should not suggest that the mere presence of the verb “to follow,” without any further premise, establishes all the components of the theory of the imamate. The strength of the seventh aspect lies precisely in this multistage argument.
20. The Limit of Signification: What Does the Seventh Aspect Not Prove?
A scholarly article must, in addition to explaining the strength of an argument, also specify its limits. First, this aspect alone does not prove that every individual who is genealogically regarded as belonging to the Ahl al-Bayt is an imam. Second, it does not directly provide the names and order of the twelve imams. Third, from the word “following” itself one cannot infer, without other premises, all the details concerning appointment, infallibility in every domain, knowledge of the unseen, or the scope of political authority. Fourth, if someone does not accept the specific chain of transmission of the version “إن اتبعتموهما”, then, in order to use this aspect, they must either regard the authentication of hadith scholars such as Ibn Ḥajar as probative in argumentation or draw on other textual evidence to establish this same meaning.
Conversely, this aspect strongly establishes, or at least confirms, three things: first, the relationship of the community to the ʿitrah in this narration is a relationship of “follower and followed,” not merely of lover and beloved; second, this following plays a fundamental role in the matter of guidance and misguidance; third, such a position entails religious authority after the Prophet. These three conclusions alone are of fundamental importance for invalidating the claim that “the Hadith of al-Thaqalayn has no connection with the imamate.”
21. Final Evaluation of Mīrzā Ḥāmid Ḥusayn’s Critique of Dehlavī
If Dehlavi’s claim is that the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things has no implication for the imamate, the seventh argument offers a substantive, text-based response. The term “following” addresses precisely the point that the denial of this implication seeks to eliminate: in this narration, the Ahl al-Bayt are not merely the objects of affectionate conduct; rather, they are those to be followed. If this following is assessed in relation to “not going astray,” their place within the structure of the community’s guidance extends beyond social respect and familial distinction.
Another strength of Mir Hamid Husayn’s method is that he uses a version transmitted in Sunni sources and even authenticated by some Sunni scholars. This method accords with the disputational tradition of “holding an opponent to what he has accepted.” Nevertheless, independent research must go one step further and also record the disagreement in narrator criticism concerning this transmission route. Thus, it may be said that the seventh argument is very strong in terms of its “textual implication”; its principal challenge concerns not the meaning of “following,” but the degree of reliability of the chain of transmission for this particular wording. If the narration is accepted, interpreting it as signifying anything other than authority in religious guidance is difficult.
Conclusion
The seventh argument in ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār is one of the most important examples of lexical-theological reasoning from the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things. It centers on the narration of Zayd ibn Arqam containing the expression “You will never go astray if you follow them both.” Lexical analysis shows that “following” signifies proceeding after the one followed and regulating one’s conduct in accordance with that person, and cannot be reduced to love or reverence. Syntactic analysis shows that the Qur’an and the Prophet’s progeny are governed by a single verb and a dual pronoun, and that, with respect to the community’s duty, both are objects of following. Contextual analysis likewise shows that “not going astray” brings following the Prophet’s progeny into the sphere of religious guidance and that, in the complete version of the narration, this theme appears alongside “the Prophet’s greater claim over the believers” and “ʿAli’s authority as mawlā.”
Consequently, the first link in the argument—namely, the principle of following the Prophet’s progeny in matters of guidance—is derived from the text itself. The second link is authoritative validity: an authority whose being followed is presented as a guarantee against going astray cannot lack religious authority in that same sphere. The third link is the imamate: binding authority in religious guidance after the Prophet is among the imam’s fundamental functions. Thus, the seventh argument proceeds not through an explicit occurrence of the word “imam,” but through necessary implication and the sequence “following → authoritative validity → religious authority → imamate.”
From the perspective of hadith scholarship, the article distinguished between two levels: the extensive transmission routes of the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things in its basic form, and the status of the chain of transmission for the specific wording “if you follow them both.” Al-Hakim and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami transmitted this version in a context of authentication and acceptance as reliable; however, critical assessments of Muhammad ibn Salama ibn Kuhayl also exist, and some later researchers have judged the chain of transmission weak. This disagreement demonstrates the need for caution in using the expression “a definitive chain of transmission”; nevertheless, within the framework of the historical argumentation of ʿAbaqāt, appealing to authentication by Sunni scholars serves a clear purpose.
Ultimately, the significance of the seventh argument lies in its challenging, from within the text of the hadith itself, the claim that the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things (Hadith al-Thaqalayn) is entirely separate from the question of the Imamate. Even when the conclusion is restricted to what can be established with certainty, the narration presents the Prophet’s progeny (ʿitrah), alongside the Quran, as an authority to be followed for guidance. Identifying the specific members of this progeny and establishing all dimensions of the theory of the Imamate constitute the next stage; nevertheless, the principle of religious authority, which is the central pillar of Mir Hamid Husayn’s reasoning in this argument, receives substantial support from the combination of “following” and “not going astray.”
Sources and References
1. Mir Hamid Husayn Musawi Lakhnawi, ʿAbaqat al-Anwar fi Imamat al-Aʾimmah al-Athar, section on the implications of Hadith al-Thaqalayn, seventh argument, pp. 69–71, according to the edition used in this study.
2. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Dihlawi, Tuhfah-i Ithna ʿAshariyyah, chapter seven, section disputing the proofs of the Imamate and Hadith al-Thaqalayn (pagination varies across editions).
3. Al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak ʿala al-Sahihayn, vol. 3, Zayd ibn Arqam’s narration of the sermon between Mecca and Medina, with the wording: “إني تارك فيكم أمرين لن تضلوا إن اتبعتموهما” (“I am leaving among you two things; you will not go astray if you follow them both”).
4. Ibn ʿAsakir, Tarikh Madinat Dimashq, vol. 42, p. 216, Abu al-Tufayl’s narration from Zayd ibn Arqam.
5. Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, al-Ṣawāʿiq al-muḥriqa, older editions, p. 148 (with different pagination in newer editions), the wording “وفي رواية صحيحة… إن اتبعتموهما” (“And in an authentic narration… if you follow them both”).
6. Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, entry “تبع” (t-b-ʿ).
7. Ibn Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī, al-Jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl, biographical entry for Muḥammad ibn Salama ibn Kuhayl.
8. Ibn ʿAdī, al-Kāmil fī ḍuʿafāʾ al-rijāl, biographical entry for Muḥammad ibn Salama ibn Kuhayl.
9. Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt, biographical entry for Muḥammad ibn Salama ibn Kuhayl.
10. Ibn al-Mulaqqin, Mukhtaṣar Istidrāk al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Dhahabī ʿalā Mustadrak al-Ḥākim, under the narration of Zayd ibn Arqam and the critique of the claim that the transmission route through Muḥammad ibn Salama ibn Kuhayl meets the criteria of the two Shaykhs (al-Bukhārī and Muslim).
11. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ and colleagues, Takhrīj Musnad al-Imām Aḥmad, the passage assessing the report containing «إن اتبعتموهما» (“if you follow them both”) and judging the chain of transmission of the route under discussion to be weak.
12. Al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, Kanz al-ʿUmmāl, the report «إني تارك فيكم أمرين لن تضلوا إن اتبعتموهما» (“I am leaving among you two things; you will not go astray if you follow them both”) (hadith numbering varies across editions).
Methodological Note
This article focuses on an independent analysis of the seventh argument on pages 69–71 of ʿAbaqāt al-Anwār. In preparing the text, later abridgments were not used as a basis for the research, and no comparison with them was undertaken. External sources were used solely to assess the report itself, the transmitters in its chain of transmission, and the meaning of the word ittibāʿ (“following”), and to clarify the argument’s premises in hadith scholarship and theology.
Author: Hamed Sarem
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