Tashyid al-Mata’in: A Scholarly Analysis Refuting the Claim of the Legitimacy of the First Caliphs (11): Abu Bakr’s Crimes: Killing, Plunder, and Rape
Author: Hamed Sarem
In the history of Abu Bakr’s caliphate, many crimes and disastrous decisions can be observed that challenge the legitimacy of his rule. From the killing and plundering of Malik ibn Nuwayra’s tribe to the rape of captive women and support for such acts, these actions not only violate Islamic principles but also demonstrate the lack of religiosity and humanity in Abu Bakr’s caliphate. This article analyzes these crimes and their effects on the legitimacy of Abu Bakr’s caliphate from religious, jurisprudential, and ethical perspectives, and examines whether such a caliphate can be considered legitimate.
Abstract
This article analyzes the atrocious crimes of the period of Abu Bakr’s caliphate and examines such cases as the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra, the plundering of property, rape of women, and the defense of such acts. From the perspective of Imamite theology, these actions clearly demonstrate the violation of infallibility and justice in Abu Bakr. In addition, the objections raised against Abu Bakr’s caliphate not only call infallibility into question, but also concern manifest immorality, depravity, and injustice, and in some cases even challenge Abu Bakr’s humanity. The article also examines how these crimes, despite jurisprudential defenses, ultimately cast doubt on the legitimacy of Abu Bakr’s caliphate and give rise to serious questions regarding his fitness to govern.
Keywords: Abu Bakr’s caliphate, atrocious crimes, Malik ibn Nuwayra, murder and rape, plunder, objection, infallibility, justice, Islamic jurisprudence, legitimacy of the caliphate.
The Scope of the Implication of Objection: From Negating Infallibility to Establishing Immorality and Usurpation
In Imamī theological logic, “taʿn” (impugnment) refers to any act or conduct indicating the violation of one of the essential conditions of the Imamate. The most important of these conditions are infallibility and knowledge. Therefore, if the conduct of a claimant to the caliphate indicates the commission of a sin or the abandonment of a definite obligation, reason regards this as clear evidence of the absence of infallibility; and this itself constitutes a complete impugnment.
Yet the more important point is that, in many cases, the scope of impugnment goes beyond the negation of infallibility. Some impugnments directly indicate immorality, depravity, moral deviation, manifest oppression, or disbelief. In such cases, even if someone does not theologically regard infallibility as a condition of the Imamate, he still cannot defend the legitimacy of one for whom reliable evidence of immorality or practical corruption exists.
More precisely, even if some Islamic schools do not regard the necessity of infallibility for the Imam and caliph as essential, impugnments indicating immorality, depravity, oppression, or usurpation still undermine the very basis of a ruler’s legitimacy even within their own accepted frameworks. For none of the Islamic schools ever accepts that one presented as the successor to the Prophet may be immoral, depraved, oppressive, or a usurper (1). In all Islamic schools, the caliphate is a religious-political office that must embody justice, piety, and moral competence; for this reason, accepting the caliphate of an immoral or tyrannical person stands in manifest conflict with the fundamental principles of the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and religious reason.
Negating the Legitimacy of the Caliphate through Impugnments: A Logical and Religious Analysis
The impugnments directed at the legitimacy of the early caliphate, in fact, not only negate infallibility, but also clearly concern immorality, depravity, widespread oppression, and even practical disbelief. These impugnments go beyond demonstrating personal corruption and seek to establish crimes that cannot easily be overlooked. In some cases, they not only reject the justice and infallibility of the person criticized, but also lead to the negation of his humanity. In particular, it may be said that, in certain instances, these individuals should be compared to Satan.
Therefore, these impugnments not only call infallibility and justice into question, but in some cases also reject humanity itself. If someone does not regard infallibility as a necessary condition for the Imamate and the caliphate succeeding the Prophet—although this condition is definitive on the basis of reason, the Qur’an, and Prophetic traditions—he cannot accept the caliphate of an immoral and depraved person who has committed grave acts of oppression. For this reason, each of these impugnments is fully sufficient for a person endowed with reason and fairness to discern the correct path amid historical and argumentative errors and fallacies.
A clear example of these reproaches is the well-known historical statement of al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be upon them) addressed to Abu Bakr: « اُنزل عن منبر جدّنا » (“Step down from the pulpit of our grandfather”). This statement itself clearly and explicitly demonstrates the following points:
The usurpation of the prophetic position is exposed; religious-political unfitness becomes evident; and the rejection of the legitimacy of the first caliphate is expressed by those whom the Qur’an explicitly identifies as the people of love, purification, and authoritative proof.
Since the addressee of this reproach claims succession to the Prophet whose pulpit he occupies, anyone who believes in the prophethood of the Prophet of Islam must necessarily acknowledge Abu Bakr’s usurpation, unless he casts doubt upon God’s wisdom, the purity of the Ahl al-Bayt, and the legitimacy of Qur’anic texts. The reproach concerning the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra and its effect on the legitimacy of the caliphate.
One of the prominent and important reproaches directed at the legitimacy of Abu Bakr’s caliphate is the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra. This incident is not only historically undeniable, but has also been recorded as a bitter and horrific crime. The killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra is by no means an ordinary act or the killing of an ordinary person; rather, it indicates a crime that an ordinary person possessing reason and humanity would not commit. Only a person devoid of these qualities and human principles is capable of perpetrating such a crime. For this reason, the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra is not merely a bitter historical event; it explicitly calls into question the legitimacy of Abu Bakr’s caliphate.
Dehlavi attempts to justify this crime through numerous arguments and defenses and to exonerate Abu Bakr from this great tragedy. Nevertheless, the late Sayyid Muhammad Quli Kinturi, in response to these efforts, rejects Dehlavi’s answers in a reasoned and logical manner and declares these defenses invalid. This decisive rejection demonstrates Sayyid Muhammad Quli’s scholarly resolve to expose the truth and to show the clear violation of moral and human principles in the defense of Abu Bakr’s caliphate.
Reproach Concerning the Killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Moral-Political Crisis
One of the major objections raised against the structure of the early Islamic caliphate is the incident of the killing of Mālik ibn Nuwayra and the violation of his wife by Khālid ibn al-Walīd. This event—particularly because it has been reported in reliable Sunni historical sources—reveals a severe moral, political, and religious crisis. The killing of Mālik ibn Nuwayra has not only been recorded in Islamic history as a great crime, but also provoked extensive reactions among the Companions and the Successors. In this regard, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s explicit objection to Abū Bakr concerning his silence regarding, or support for, Khālid ibn al-Walīd clearly demonstrates the depth of a tragedy over which even some steadfast defenders of Abū Bakr, who had defended him in various errors, voiced their اعتراض.
This crime shows that Abū Bakr, as the caliph of the time, when faced with corrupt conduct by one of his commanders, not only failed to administer justice, but, through his silence and support for Khālid ibn al-Walīd, also failed properly to fulfill his responsibility to preserve the legal limits of the Sharīʿa and implement Islamic justice. This incident not only underscores the absence of justice in that period, but has also been severely criticized from moral and humanitarian perspectives.
Notably, this act even provoked a reaction from ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. ʿUmar, who was ordinarily quick to defend Abū Bakr and his decisions, explicitly objected to Abū Bakr in this case and criticized the conduct of Khālid ibn al-Walīd. Such an objection from a person like ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who would ordinarily align himself with the caliph even in his errors, testifies to the gravity of the tragedy that occurred in this affair and, undeniably, challenges the legitimacy of Abū Bakr’s caliphate.
Ultimately, this objection, which plainly demonstrates a violation of justice, religiosity, and even humanity, is not directed solely at Khālid ibn al-Walīd; it also concerns Abū Bakr, who, as caliph, not only refrained from administering justice in the face of an evident crime, but also contributed to the continuation of this crime through his silence and support for his commander. This event must be examined as one of the most important grounds for criticizing the legitimacy of Abū Bakr’s caliphate. Analysis of the Objection Concerning the Killing of Mālik ibn Nuwayra: A Critique of Dihlawī’s Defense and an Examination of the Legitimacy of the Caliphate.
Dihlawī, in his book Tuḥfa-yi Ithnā ʿAshariyya, has sought to repel the objection raised concerning the killing of Mālik ibn Nuwayra and the crimes of Khālid ibn al-Walīd through unstable justifications and analyses based on the assumption of the universal probity of the Companions, and to defend the legitimacy of Abū Bakr and the judgment he issued concerning this crime. Yet, when these defenses are measured against reason and morality, they are not only unable to remove the objection, but themselves become a new objection against the caliphate’s system of judgment.
In this section, we shall examine the various dimensions of this crime through a precise, step-by-step analysis of Dihlawī’s claims and an assessment of his arguments in light of Qur’anic, rational, and moral criteria. Specifically:
Firstly, the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra was a blatant violation of religious commitment, justice, and the limits prescribed by Islamic law. The killing of an innocent Muslim without trial is a clear example of oppression and corruption that cannot be overlooked in Islamic history. Secondly, the caliph’s defense of Khalid ibn al-Walid implicitly endorses immorality and bloodshed, causing the condition of justice to fall away from the foremost person of the caliphate. If a caliph, who ought to safeguard justice and religious commitment, remains silent in the face of such a person’s crimes, the legitimacy of his caliphate is seriously called into question. Thirdly, the objection in this incident is a composite objection: on the one hand, it concerns the killer (Khalid ibn al-Walid), and on the other, the one who justified him (Abu Bakr). In other words, this crime and the caliphate’s silence not only affect the character of the individual killer, but also weaken the caliph’s legitimacy and fitness before history. Finally, this incident is conclusive evidence for the denial of the justice of the Companions. Indeed, the case of Khalid ibn al-Walid is a test for assessing the truth or falsity of this assumption. If Companions who are recognized as leaders of Islam display such conduct, this itself negates justice within the structure of the caliphate.
This objection should not be regarded merely as a marginal incident in history; rather, it must be examined within the judgment concerning the legitimacy of the caliphate. For in this event, the most fundamental conditions of the caliphate, notwithstanding disagreements over its requirements, were violated simultaneously. Religious commitment, justice, and the duty to protect the oppressed were all called into question in this affair, and the legitimacy of Abu Bakr’s caliphate was clearly challenged.
Second Objection: The Killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra and Rape; a Test of the Caliph’s Justice
Dehlawi recounts this objection in Tuhfat al-Ithna ‘Ashariyya as follows: The Shi‘a say: “Malik ibn Nuwayra was a Muslim man and had a beautiful wife. Khalid ibn al-Walid, a commander appointed by Abu Bakr, killed him and slept with his wife that same night, before the waiting period of widowhood (‘idda)—four months and ten days—had ended. From a jurisprudential perspective, this act constitutes fornication, because marriage during the waiting period is not only invalid but also forbidden and liable to the prescribed punishment. Yet Abu Bakr neither imposed the prescribed punishment on Khalid nor exacted retaliation from him, although both were incumbent upon him. ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab also strongly objected to this act and said to Khalid: If I were in Abu Bakr’s place, I would exact retaliation from you.”
According to this objection, three fundamental issues are called into question:
1. The killing of a Muslim without offense and without trial: Malik ibn Nuwayra was recognized as a Muslim, not as a combatant against the community. Killing him without proof of a crime is a clear instance of oppression and a violation of judicial justice, which is severely condemned in Islam. 2. The brutal violation of Malik’s wife and marriage during the waiting period: Violating a woman observing the waiting period after her husband’s death, even through a formal marriage contract, is regarded by scholarly consensus as illegitimate and a manifest sin. This act is not only contrary to the Sharia but also entails a prescribed legal punishment. 3. The caliph’s silence and failure to enforce the prescribed punishment: Abu Bakr’s silence and his failure to impose the punishment for fornication or the ruling of retaliation upon Khalid were not merely a jurisprudential error; they constituted a refusal to implement Islamic justice. This is one of the greatest objections concerning the religious integrity and legitimacy of governance in Islamic history.
Therefore, this reproach not only emphasizes the conduct of Khalid ibn al-Walid, but also directly challenges the institution of the caliphate and its legitimacy. This incident clearly constitutes a violation of the fundamental principles of Islamic justice and underscores the caliph’s duty to establish justice. Failure to act against this crime and the deprivation of justice therein directly call the legitimacy of the caliphate into question and prove that Abu Bakr was not only not responsible for upholding justice and equity, but also shirked his fundamental duties.
The second reproach, which refers to one of the great crimes in Islamic history, has broad dimensions and clearly challenges the legitimacy of Abu Bakr’s caliphate. It concerns the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra and the violation of his wife and the women of the tribe, for which there is undoubtedly no legal or rational justification. In his effort to absolve Abu Bakr of this crime, Dehlavi sought, through various justifications and defenses, to downplay the role of the first caliph in this event and to deny that the reproach was directed at him. Nevertheless, before addressing Dehlavi’s responses, it is necessary first to examine carefully the incident itself and its context. In this regard, the late Muhammad Quli, author of Tashīd al-Maṭāʿin, analyzed and examined these reproaches and responded to Dehlavi’s objections.
Examining the Original Account
At the outset, the late Muhammad Quli emphasizes that, before entering into a critique of Dehlavi’s responses, it is necessary to examine and explain fully the original account and the course of events from which the reproach arose. He states that he narrates the basis of this account from Shi‘a scholars, and that these reports serve as the principal foundation for a more precise understanding of the nature of these reproaches and the criticisms subsequently raised. Hence, the first step in this analysis is a careful examination of the quotations from these Shi‘a scholars so that Dehlavi’s criticisms may be assessed accurately and with reference to reliable sources.
Examining the First Reproach against the First Caliph from the Perspective of Shi‘a Scholars
The late Muhammad Quli then refers to quotations from certain Shi‘a scholars who have set forth the reproaches in detail. In this section, the original account and the events that led to these reproaches are presented clearly and explicitly. This is done to gain a better and deeper understanding of the issue, so that the criticisms raised may be properly analyzed and assessed. After this preliminary examination and the clarification of the dimensions of the incident, the time will come for a more precise analysis of Dehlavi’s objections and responses to these reproaches, which will be examined fully with reference to Qur’anic, rational, and ethical criteria.
An Introduction to the Account of the Author of al-Istighāthah
The late Sayyid Muḥammad-Qulī states:
“We shall first cite the original wording of some of our eminent scholars, which contains the presentation of this objection; thereafter, we shall turn to refuting his doubts and invalidating his statements. Know, then, that the author of the book al-Istighāthah (2), after completing the first of the objections against Abū Bakr—which involves his applying to himself the expression ‘the Caliph of the Messenger’ (may God’s blessings be upon him and his family)—said:”
The Incident of Withholding Zakāt and the War against the People of Ridda
When the people accepted Abū Bakr’s caliphate, whether voluntarily or under compulsion, a tribe among the Arabs refused to pay him zakāt and said:
“The Messenger of God (may God’s blessings be upon him and his family) never commanded us to give our zakāt to you, nor did he appoint you to request it from us. So on what basis do you demand from us something that neither God nor His Messenger has commanded?”
This group of Muslims became known as the “Ahl al-Ridda” (the people of apostasy).
Severe Suppression by Abu Bakr’s Order
Abu Bakr ordered Khalid ibn al-Walid to suppress these people. In this war, Khalid fought them and killed many of them. He took their women and children captive and plundered their property. All these spoils were distributed among the Muslims, who benefited from them without any difficulty. Nevertheless, some Muslims objected to this conduct, including Umar ibn al-Khattab, who rejected and declined his share of the spoils.
The Marriage of Amir al-Mu’minin (a) to Khawla bint Ja‘far
He retained these spoils until authority came into his hands, and then returned them to their rightful owners. Khawla bint Ja‘far, the mother of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, was among this group. She was sent to Amir al-Mu’minin Ali ibn Abi Talib (peace be upon him), and Imam Ali (peace be upon him), with her full consent, took her as his wife, as with free women upon whom no transaction may be imposed. However, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) did not take ownership of her, while preserving her dignity and rights.
The Account of the Killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra and His Wife
On the other hand, Khalid ibn al-Walid killed Malik ibn Nuwayrah, the chief of his people, and took his wife. That same night, without observing the waiting period (‘iddah) of four months and ten days, he had intercourse with her. Khalid not only did not observe istibra’ [the required waiting period to establish that the womb was clear], but he did not purchase that woman, nor did any portion of Malik ibn Nuwayrah’s property devolve upon him.
‘Umar’s Strong Objection to Khalid’s Conduct
‘Umar strongly objected to Khalid’s conduct and said to Abu Bakr: “What does this act mean?” In defense of Khalid, Abu Bakr stated: “Khalid is a Muslim man who exercised interpretation and erred!” Yet Abu Bakr voiced no opposition to Khalid and supported him in this action.
Even according to the reports of the hadith scholars, transmitted without any disagreement, those who were with Khalid said: “Our muezzin gave the call to prayer, and their muezzin also gave the call to prayer; we prayed, and they prayed; we pronounced the two testimonies of faith, and they pronounced them as well.”
‘Umar: Why Do You Fight Those Who Are Muslims?
Under such circumstances, how can one object to these people, while all of them emphasize that ‘Umar said to Abu Bakr:
“How can you fight a people who say: ‘There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’? I heard the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) say: ‘I have been commanded to fight the people until they say: “There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.” When they say this, their blood and property are protected, except where its rights are due, and their reckoning is with Allah.’”
Abu Bakr’s Response and His Justification for His Action
Abu Bakr said:
“If they withheld from me even a camel tether, I would fight them ... or I would say that I would wage jihad against them.”
This conduct on his part indicates a heinous act, a great injustice, and an evident transgression. From where did he obtain permission to wage jihad against those who did not give him something that the Prophet had not commanded them to give?!
Was Abu Bakr’s War Based on the Sharia or Personal Opinion?
If his followers claim that this was based on the command of God and the Prophet, they must provide sufficient proof and evidence from the Qur’an or from a specific hadith of the Prophet, mentioning their names and lineages; for how could such a matter be established without clear evidence and merely by appealing to the teachings of the Infallibles?
And if they say that his action was based on his own judgment and preference, they are asked:
“Who, on the basis of his own opinion, decided to kill Muslims, plunder their property, and reduce them to spoils of war? In your view, is such a person an oppressor, or did he have the right to do so?”
A Contradiction in Judging Between Oppression and Legitimacy
If they say that he had the right to do so, then in reality they have declared the blood of Muslims, their women, and their children lawful, and have treated their property as spoils of war. Whoever says such a thing has certainly departed from the religion of Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وآله), in the judgment of every person endowed with understanding and reason.
And if they say that he was an oppressor, then this itself is a great disgrace and grave sin, and ultimately leads to irreligion and ignorance.
Umar’s Reaction During His Caliphate
Moreover, according to all narrators, they say: “Umar ibn al-Khattab was, throughout his life, intensely displeased with this action and with the conduct of Khalid ibn al-Walid.” In particular, regarding the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra and his tribe, and the application of the term “apostate” to them, he said that this was among the astonishing instances of injustice and the great and reprehensible innovations for which there is no possible defense.
Returning the Captives and Property to Malik’s Family
Likewise, all narrators have reported that when Umar ibn al-Khattab assumed authority, he gathered the surviving members of Malik ibn Nuwayra’s clan and recovered whatever of their property, children, and women was in the possession of the Muslims, returning it to them. Some reports also state that he brought back some of their women from the regions of Tustar, and that some of those women were pregnant. He returned these women to their husbands.
The Great Corruption Whether Abu Bakr’s Action Was Wrong or Correct
If Abu Bakr’s action in this matter was erroneous, it means that he fed the Muslims with unlawful property that he had taken from them, gave them unlawfully enslaved persons from among their children, and permitted unlawful relations with their women. In that case, his action was not only a cause of great disgrace, but also a form of painful torment.
But if Abu Bakr’s action was correct, this means that Umar usurped the women of a people who had lawfully owned them, forcibly took them from their owners, and returned them to another people who were not entitled to possess them. He unlawfully placed these women at their disposal without any legal agreement and without payment of a dower.
In Any Case, Religious and Moral Corruption Is Established
In both cases—whether all these acts took place or only one of them was committed—the Muslims have gained unlawful access to the women of their people and to the property of those killed because zakat had been withheld from them. In these circumstances, the guardians of the slain must now decide which situation to choose and which one they wish to reject; yet in truth, neither of these two options can be acceptable to them.
For each of these acts has not only violated the sanctity of Muslims, but has also, fundamentally and openly, led to the discrediting of and disrespect for the rulings of the religious law. In either case, none of these acts can receive the approval or satisfaction of God and the Messenger of Allah.
Analysis of Crimes and Objections During Abu Bakr’s Caliphate: Massacre, Rape
1. Allegiance to Abu Bakr: Willingly and unwillingly, people in the circumstances following the death of the Prophet (صلى الله علیه وآله) pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr in two ways: some voluntarily and others under compulsion. This difference in the manner of allegiance indicates the absence of the consensus claimed by the supporters of Abu Bakr’s rule. In other words, forced allegiance points to a harsh coup.
2. Refusal to Pay Zakat and Objections to the Legitimacy of the Caliphate
Some tribes refused to pay zakat to Abu Bakr, because the Prophet had issued no instruction that zakat be paid to Abu Bakr. These objections indicated their non-acceptance of Abu Bakr’s caliphate. Put more clearly, Abu Bakr had no instruction from the Prophet even for collecting zakat, and he proceeded to collect zakat on the basis of his self-proclaimed caliphate.
3. The Term “Ahl al-Riddah” and Its Analysis
Using the term “Ahl al-Riddah” for those who refused to pay zakat is incorrect and misleading. These people had not apostatized from the religion; they merely disagreed with Abu Bakr over a financial matter.
4. Abu Bakr’s Response to the Objections
Abu Bakr used military force to suppress the groups that had refused to pay zakat. This response demonstrates the use of military repression. Put plainly, following the military coup, the claim that they were “Ahl al-Riddah” became a pretext for massacring the opponents.
5. Khalid ibn al-Walid’s Crimes, the Killing of Malik ibn Nuwayrah, and the Assault on Women
In his war against the tribe of Malik ibn Nuwayrah, Khalid ibn al-Walid not only killed the fighters, but also plundered their property and women. Khalid assaulted Malik’s wife. This assault was not only unlawful and contrary to the standards of all religions, but was also an act devoid even of the scent of humanity.
6. Umar ibn al-Khattab’s Objection to Khalid’s Conduct
Umar ibn al-Khattab strongly objected to Khalid’s actions and asked Abu Bakr to respond to them. However, Abu Bakr defended Khalid and said that he had erred on the basis of his personal ijtihad.
7. Critique of Personal Ijtihad and the Justification of Errors
Abu Bakr’s defense of Khalid as having made an erroneous ijtihad was, in reality, disregard for all the principles to which humanity is committed. It was an ijtihad endorsed neither by religion nor accepted by human principles—an ijtihad on the basis of which every killing and crime becomes legitimate and correct.
8. The conflict between the two caliphs establishes the certainty that a crime occurred. If Abu Bakr’s decisions had been correct, Umar ibn al-Khattab would not have needed to return the women and property of Malik’s tribe. This action indicates a grave crime in dealing with the rights of Muslims and a violation of Islamic principles.
Conclusion: The Illegitimacy of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate on the Basis of All Principles
This incident demonstrates Abu Bakr’s lack of infallibility from various aspects. Moreover, the incident in question also proves the lack of Abu Bakr’s religiosity. How can someone be deemed an apostate because of a financial dispute? And how can his blood and that of his tribe be spilled on the pretext of this apostasy? In addition to undermining Abu Bakr’s faith and religion, this incident clearly demonstrates a violation of humanity as well. On what principles of fairness and humanity can one kill a person over financial disputes, sexually assault his women and those of his tribe, and then treat them as captives or slave women?
Therefore, based on the account of Malik ibn Nuwayra, Abu Bakr cannot establish the legitimacy of his caliphate, even if this matter is examined according to the principles of those who do not consider infallibility a condition for the caliphate.
The horrific crimes that occurred during Abu Bakr’s caliphate—especially the killing of Malik ibn Nuwayra, the plundering of property, the sexual assault of captive women, and support for these acts—clearly call the legitimacy of his caliphate into question. These actions are not only unjustifiable according to Islamic and jurisprudential principles, but also conflict with justice, religiosity, and human ethics. Even if some Islamic schools do not consider infallibility a condition for the caliphate, none of them can defend the legitimacy of the caliphate of a person who has committed manifest immorality, debauchery, and injustice. For this reason, based on the account of Malik ibn Nuwayra and the crimes arising from it, Abu Bakr’s caliphate is devoid of legitimacy from both jurisprudential and ethical perspectives, and any defense of this caliphate merely distorts the truth and calls into question the fundamental principles of Islam.
Footnotes:
1. Jurisprudential–theological footnote | The place of justice in the legitimacy of the caliphate from the perspective of Islamic schools of thought
In most Sunni theological sources, the condition of justice for the caliphate, although sometimes accompanied by leniencies in political history, has always been emphasized in theory. For example:
Qadi ‘Adud al-Din al-Iji states explicitly in al-Mawaqif that the caliph must possess worthy qualities, including: العدالة، والعلم، والكفاءة، وسلامة من الفسق والفجور (al-Mawaqif, vol. 3, p. 577). Imam al-Mawardi al-Shafi‘i, in al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, places the condition of justice at the head of the caliph’s conditions and says: «أن يكون عدلاً، مجتنباً للكبائر، غير مصرّ على الصغائر» (al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, p. 5). Ibn Taymiyyah, too, despite defending some caliphs, acknowledges in Minhaj al-Sunnah that: «لا تجوز إمامة الفاسق ولا الظالم الجائر، لأنه خائنٌ لله ورسوله» (Minhaj al-Sunnah, vol. 1, p. 114). Even al-Ghazali, in al-Iqtisad fi al-I‘tiqad, explicitly states that if the ruler’s wickedness becomes manifest, removing him is obligatory and obeying him is not permissible (al-Iqtisad, p. 124).
Therefore, in the theological and jurisprudential principles of Islamic schools of thought, the caliph must be just, religious, and entrusted with the interests of the Ummah. If wickedness, injustice, or usurpation is proven against him, no school has ruled that his caliphate may continue—let alone that he should be regarded as the Prophet’s “legitimate caliph.”
2. The book al-Istighathah fi Bida‘ al-Thalathah, authored by Abu al-Qasim al-Kufi, examines the innovations of the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman) and is considered one of the important works concerning criticisms of them. This book critiques and examines the actions of the early caliphs and has distinctive features in its analysis of the historiography of that period. Many Shi‘a scholars, including the late al-Najashi, Ibn Shahrashub, al-Bayadi, al-Afandi, and others, have affirmed the attribution of this book to Abu al-Qasim al-Kufi. A manuscript copy of this book, written in the year 1969 AH, is held in the Central Library of Astan Quds, and the late Muhammad Quli referred to this copy in his book and used it to recount the story of Malik ibn Nuwayrah and the conduct of Khalid ibn al-Walid.)
