Reinforcing the Critiques: A Scholarly Analysis Refuting the Claim of the Legitimacy of the First Caliphs (14) — The Qur’an-Documented Victim; the Power-Hungry, Lust-Driven Killer
Author: Hamed Sarem
“A Quran-Grounded Victim Who Affirmed the Prophetic Station; a Lust-Driven Killer Seeking Power”
Read the truth aloud: the victim relied on the Qur’an, while the killer relied on power. The issue was not zakat; it was authority—whose hand gives meaning to “خُذْ/صَلِّ/سَكَنٌ”? When analogy is set above explicit scriptural text, justice falls from the scales and blood drips drop by drop. This killing was not an incident; it was a trial of legitimacy. If the Prophet’s ṣalāt is solace, then unscriptural combat has no answer—and history demands witnesses.
Abstract:
By re-examining the case of Mālik ibn Nuwayra in light of verse 9:103 of Sūrat al-Tawbah (“خُذْ مِنْ أَمْوَالِهِمْ صَدَقَةً… وَصَلِّ عَلَیْهِمْ إِنَّ صَلَاتَکَ سَکَنٌ لَهُمْ”), this article demonstrates that his conduct was not a “refusal of zakat.” Rather, on the basis of that very verse, he advanced a Quranic argument concerning the legitimate authority entitled to collect it and the Prophetic effect of “ṣalāt/sakan.” Accordingly, the attribution of “apostasy” to Mālik ibn Nuwayra lacks reliable support and is unacceptable. At the same time, the act of killing him and its justification constituted a clear transgression of the bounds of justice and disregard for the criteria necessary to safeguard Muslim lives. The article’s analytical conclusion is as follows: Mālik’s killers—and those who supported their decision—were, because they transgressed the necessary standards of commitment to infallibility and justice in judgment and governance, unqualified for the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community; this case is a concrete example that fundamentally destabilizes the claim to the legitimacy of that caliphate.
Keywords: verse 9:103; Mālik ibn Nuwayra; rejection of alms; zakat refuser; apostasy; ṣalāt and sakan; justice; infallibility; legitimacy of the caliphate; Khālid ibn al-Walīd; Abū Bakr.
Introduction:
This article is the logical continuation of the previous study on “the rational necessity of infallibility in the Imamate.” There, we demonstrated that absolute obedience to a non-infallible ruler—especially in the sphere of post-textual governance—inevitably leads to the delegitimization of justice and to the transformation of “a forbidden act” into “a rewarded ijtihād.” The historical case of Mālik ibn Nuwayra—his killing at the hands of Khālid ibn al-Walīd and Khālid’s consummation with his wife—in relation to Abū Bakr’s support and ʿUmar’s explicit objection (his demand for the ḥadd punishment and qiṣāṣ), exposed a methodological rupture between preferring “analogy” over “text” and reinforced the rational argument for making infallibility a condition.
Focusing on the juridical-exegetical dimension of that same case, the present article addresses the “claim of rejecting alms” and the key question: “Is the collection of zakāt exclusive to the Messenger of God (PBUH)?” The discussion centers on examining the arguments of those who withheld zakāt on the basis of verse 9:103 (“Take from their wealth a charity… and pray for them; indeed, your prayer is a comfort for them”) and analyzing the implications of “purification/cleansing” and “comfort” in relation to the person of the Prophet and the act of collection and subsequent prayer. It then considers whether this interpretation, at least as a “valid taʾwīl,” precludes a ruling of apostasy and removes the permissibility of fighting. Along this path, the reports of Fakhr al-Rāzī, al-Qasṭallānī (the commentator on al-Bukhārī), and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s account of the arguments advanced by those who withheld zakāt are comparatively assessed alongside relevant historical reports, in order to clarify that: 1) “rejecting alms,” in the sense of local distribution, is compatible with the texts of the Ṣaḥīḥayn; 2) even on the assumption that they were returned to the zakāt-payers, the taʾwīl of “the exclusivity of collection to the person of the Prophet (PBUH)” constitutes a doubt that removes the ḥadd and the grounds for fighting; and 3) the general fighting of those who withheld zakāt was methodologically conflicted with the consensus reports of that period and with argumentation based on textual evidence.
What is the relationship of “Take/pray/comfort” in verse 9:103 to “the Prophetic exclusivity of collecting zakāt,” and can it provide a basis for a valid Sharīʿa-based excuse for those who withheld it? If “exclusivity” or “local distribution” is acceptable, does the ruling of apostasy and fighting in the case of Mālik ibn Nuwayra remain justified? How did the methodological conflict of “text/analogy” in post-textual judgment affect the political decision of the first caliphate? What exactly was the status of “the consensus of the Companions” concerning the fighting of those who withheld zakāt, on the basis of the historical reports of that time?
Innovation and Contribution of the Research
Shifting the discussion from the level of narrative-event to that of the “foundation of political jurisprudence”: demonstrating that the fate of Muslims’ blood and property has been tied to a particular reading of a single verse and to the displacement of “textual proof” by “analogy.” Explaining that, even on the basis of the “rule of ilzām” and the sources trusted by Ahl al-Sunna, the claim of “collective apostasy” and the “permissibility of fighting” in Mālik’s case lacks a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Providing an analytical bridge from a “historical case file” to the “theoretical principle of imamate”: when justice is surrendered to the “expediency of power,” the rational necessity of infallibility is not merely a theological proposition, but a guarantor of public rights.
Plan and structure of the next article
Presentation of the claim and al-Dihlawī’s formulation concerning the “rejection of alms” and apostasy; exegetical analysis of verse 9:103, focusing on “khudh/ṣalli/sakan” (Fakhr al-Rāzī, al-Qasṭallānī); juridical examination of the dichotomy of “local distribution/returning [the alms] to the alms-givers” and its relation to apostasy; the rule of ilzām and the conflict between text and analogy in judging armed combat; consensus, consultation, and opposition to fighting those who withheld [alms] in accounts from that same period; conclusion: the juridical-political implications for Mālik’s case and its relation to the criterion of legitimacy.
A Documented Re-reading of Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin by Sayyid Muḥammad Qulī Kantūrī
The Claim of “Rejecting Alms”: A Pretext for Excommunication and Killing
1) First: A Chain-of-Transmission Objection to al-Dihlawī’s Report (Contradiction and the Absence of the Text in al-Ṭabarī)
Al-Dihlawi states in one place: “After the Prophet’s death (PBUH), Malik ibn Nuwayra returned the collected alms to his people.” Yet in his own marginal note he quotes al-Tabari as saying that Malik, on the contrary, said: “Let us collect the alms and send them to him so that he may know that we are upon the religion of Islam …,” and that Khalid likewise “came, took the alms, and sent them.” Two contradictions arise here:
A thematic contradiction (returning them to his people ↔ collecting and sending them as a declaration of Islam), and a source contradiction: the very alleged wording that al-Dihlawi attributes to “al-Tabari” has not been found in reliable editions of al-Tabari; therefore, his citation is weak.
Methodological point: “the text is not found in al-Tabari” + “the content of the two reports is inconsistent” = the collapse of the first pillar of al-Dihlawi’s argument in this matter.
2) Sayyid Muhammad Quli’s response: the two forms of “returning the alms” are neither apostasy-inducing
Sayyid Muhammad Quli al-Kanturi, in Tashyid al-Mata'in, divides the case of “returning the alms” into two forms and demonstrates, for each, that apostasy does not necessarily follow:
First form: “returning them to the poor of that same people” (local disbursement of zakat).
If “returning” means that the very alms taken from the wealthy were distributed among the poor of that same tribe, this accords with the explicit text; for the hadith of Muʿādh (in the two Ṣaḥīḥs) states:
“... Indeed, Allah has made obligatory upon them an alms-tax, taken from their wealthy and returned to their poor ...” (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Kitāb al-Īmān; Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Kitāb al-Zakāh)
Authoritative Sunni commentaries likewise affirm local disbursement and prohibit transferring zakāh from the locality where the wealth is held—when eligible categories are present:
Al-Qasṭallānī: “... It contains a prohibition on transferring zakāh from the locality of the wealth, because the pronoun in ‘their poor’ refers back to the people of Yemen ...” (Irshād al-Sārī, 3/37–38). Al-Nawawī: “... Zakāh is not to be transferred away from the locality of the wealth, owing to his (PBUH) statement: ‘and returned to their poor.’” (Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim).
Therefore, if the owner distributed it among the same people, there is no blame upon him whatsoever.
Second scenario: “returning it to the zakāh payers,” through the interpretation that “the act of taking is exclusively reserved for the Messenger (PBUH).”
And if “returning” means giving it back to the payers themselves, even then no ruling of apostasy follows; for—as the late Sayyid Muhammad Quli expressly states in Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin—this conduct may be understood as resting on a juridical interpretation that regarded “the collection of zakāt” as exclusive to the person of the Messenger (PBUH). Fakhr al-Rāzī, under Qur’an 9:103 (“Take from their wealth a charity… and pray for them; indeed, your prayer is a comfort for them”), reports this interpretation from the “withholders of zakāt,” and al-Qasṭallānī likewise recounts the argument: zakāt taken by the Prophet (PBUH) is characterized by effects issuing only from his own prayer, purification, and sanctification; therefore, no one other than the Messenger (PBUH) is his “deputy” in these effects. Accordingly, restitution may have resulted from this understanding—an understanding which, even if mistaken, belongs to the category of interpretation/ijtihād, not denial of the principle of zakāt and not grounds for declaring someone an unbeliever.
Explicit quotation from Sayyid Muhammad Quli (the exact wording of Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin):
“And if his intention is that Mālik returned to those same people the alms from their property that he had taken, then, assuming this report to be true—on the supposition that the report is sound—the reason may have been that Mālik considered the command to collect alms to be exclusive to the Messenger of God, blessings and peace be upon him and his family; and this meaning cannot entail apostasy.”
This statement by Sayyid Muhammad Quli—which constitutes the pillar of this chapter’s argument in Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin—shows precisely that both possibilities of “returning” (local distribution / repayment to the zakāt payers on the interpretation of exclusivity) are compatible with Mālik’s Islam, and that neither authorizes collective warfare or killing.
The Critical Conclusion of Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin
In terms of transmission: al-Dihlawī’s claim concerning al-Ṭabarī is either self-contradictory (returning ↔ sending), or has no basis in al-Ṭabarī’s text; hence, his evidentiary foundation collapses. In terms of implication: “returning [zakāt] to the poor of that same people” accords with the text, “it is returned among their poor (تُرَدّ فی فقرائِهم)”; while “returning it to the zakāt payers”—on the basis of the interpretation that “collection is exclusive to the Messenger (PBUH),” also reported by Fakhr al-Rāzī and al-Qasṭallānī—is a form of juridical interpretation, not denial of its obligation.
Therefore, as Tashyid al-Mata'in explains, the “rejection of alms”—in either of its possible forms—neither proves Malik’s apostasy, nor justifies Khalid’s action, nor absolves Abu Bakr of his religious responsibility for suspending the prescribed punishment and retaliation against Khalid ibn al-Walid.
A Documentary Qur’anic-Hadith Reassessment in Tashyid al-Mata'in and a Critique of Dehlavi’s Inconsistency
2) Is “collecting zakat” exclusive to the Messenger of God (PBUH)?
2.1 The Central Question
The issue is this: Is “collecting zakat” and the consequent legal effects thereof (purification, spiritual refinement, and soothing the heart of the zakat payer) truly exclusive to the person of the Prophet (PBUH)? Or can one only conjecture that Malik ibn Nuwayra understood it in this way? The answer to this question determines whether Malik’s “rejection of alms” was an interpretation or apostasy. (
2.2 The Two Forms of “Rejection of Alms” in the Account of Sayyid Muhammad Quli Kinturi
Al-Kanturi states plainly and explicitly: “If what is meant is that Malik should return the alms he had collected to those same individuals, then—assuming the report is sound—the reason is that he knew the matter of collecting zakat was specific to the Messenger of God (PBUH); and such an understanding does not entail apostasy.” (Tashyid al-Mata'in) Therefore, whether “returning it to the poor of that same tribe” or “giving it back to the original payers”—if based on such an understanding—constitutes neither a denial of the principle of zakat nor grounds for declaring someone an unbeliever. (Tashyid al-Mata'in)
2.3 Sunni Internal Argument from Qur’an 9:103 (as narrated from Fakhr al-Razi)
Tashyid al-Mata'in reports that Fakhr al-Razi, in his commentary on the verse, “Take from their wealth a charity … and pray for them; indeed, your prayer is a source of tranquility for them,” wrote that a group during the era of Abu Bakr cited this very verse. They maintained that, in their view, the obligation of zakat was tied to effects that could be realized only through the Prophet’s (PBUH) own act: the “taking of zakat” by the Prophet, the “purification and sanctification” brought about through that taking, and a “prayer” that truly brings tranquility to the legally responsible person. On this basis, entrusting zakat to someone other than the Prophet (PBUH) was problematic. This view—even if deemed erroneous—is interpretation, not denial of a necessarily established religious matter. (Fakhr al-Razi’s al-Tafsir al-Kabir, on al-Tawbah: 103; cited in Tashyid al-Mata'in)
2.4 A Sunni Hadith Witness (al-Qastallani, commentator on al-Bukhari)
In Irshad al-Sari (a commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari), it is likewise reported that, after the Prophet’s (PBUH) death, a group who retained their faith but did not pay zakat invoked this same verse and said that this obligation was particular to the prophetic era; for the “taking of zakat,” the “purification/sanctification of the payer,” and the “prayer that brings tranquility” do not lie within the competence of anyone other than the Prophet. (al-Qastallani’s Irshad al-Sari; cited in Tashyid al-Mata'in)
2.5 The Theological Formulation of the Dispute (Ibn Abi al-Hadid)
Ibn Abi al-Hadid likewise reports this reasoning: the Qur’anic description of the prescribed zakat shows that the “Messenger,” by taking it, purifies and sanctifies, and that “his prayer” brings reassurance; these qualities are not realized in anyone other than him. Thus, the dispute of those who withheld zakat concerned the recipient to whom it was to be delivered, not the underlying obligation itself. Their statement, therefore, was not a denial of a religious necessity, but rather a claim of “conditional obligation”; affirming or denying this condition is a theoretical matter, not a self-evident one. (Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah of Ibn Abi al-Hadid, vol. 17; cited in Tashyid al-Mata'in)
2.6 Juristic–Hadith Conclusion
On the basis of these same internal Sunni sources compiled by Tashyid al-Mata'in:
If the “returning of alms” meant returning them to the poor of that same town/people, it accords with the hadith of Mu'adh and the well-known understanding that zakat should not be transferred from the locality of the wealth; there is no room for reproach. (Sharh Sahih Muslim, al-Nawawi; Irshad al-Sari, al-Qastallani; cited in Tashyid al-Mata'in) If the “returning to the donors” was based on the exclusivity of receiving zakat and its effects to the person of the Prophet (PBUH), it is, at most, an interpretation and does not entail apostasy. (Tafsir al-Kabir; Irshad al-Sari; Sharh Ibn Abi al-Hadid; cited in Tashyid al-Mata'in)
2.7 A Decisive Logical Blow to the Sunni Defense
Tashyid al-Mata'in rests on a key admission: Abu Bakr himself said regarding the killing of Malik, “He interpreted and erred.” In this statement, Abu Bakr plainly acknowledged Khalid’s error. The conclusion is clear: either they must say that Malik did not deny zakat—in which case the attribution of apostasy to him is invalid—or they must say that denying zakat does not warrant execution—in which case the fighting of zakat-withholders and the construction of merit upon it collapse. Under either alternative, al-Dihlawi’s defense is overturned, and the reproach against Abu Bakr remains standing. (Tashyid al-Mata'in)
Conclusion
1) On the basis of Qur’anic–hadith evidence within the Sunni school, the understanding that “the collection of zakat and its effects were exclusively tied to the person of the Prophet (PBUH)” is supported by prior reliable transmission; thus, Malik’s “refusal of alms”—if he indeed did so—was an interpretive judgment, not apostasy. 2) The reports of al-Qastallani and Ibn Abi al-Hadid make clear that the dispute concerned the locus of submission and the condition for the realization of prophetic effects, not a denial of zakat’s obligatoriness; therefore, takfir and armed combat on this basis are unwarranted. 3) Given Abu Bakr’s explicit acknowledgment of “interpretation and error,” the claimants are inevitably left with two invalid alternatives; under either, the basis of al-Dihlawi’s defense and the “exoneration of Khalid” collapses.
This clearly demonstrates that the case of Malik ibn Nuwayra is not merely an indictment of Khalid’s conduct and Abu Bakr’s support for him; it is also empirical testimony to the article’s general thesis: when imamate is stripped of infallibility and demands absolute obedience, justice becomes a victim of expedient rationalizations—and Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin establishes this step by step, through evidence drawn from within the rival tradition.
3) The Verse’s Key Point: “Purification” and “Tranquility” Are the Work of the Prophet, Not of the Property Itself
3.1 Let Us Not Lose Sight of the Principal Agent
In a precise reading of the verse, the chain of effect passes through “property,” yet it is bound to the “person of the Messenger”: he is the one who receives; he is the one who, through it, purifies and sanctifies; and it is his “prayer” that is a source of “tranquility.” Thus, the focal point is not an administrative mechanism; rather, it is prophetic agency that brings about purification and sanctification.
3.2 “Ṣalāt”: Not Mere Supplication, but a Prophetic Constitutive Effect
In the verse, “ṣalāt” is not equivalent to every ordinary supplication; it is reassuring (it brings “sakan” [tranquility]). This “sakan” arises from the Messenger’s ṣalāt, not from words uttered by just anyone. Thus, once again, the “person of the Prophet” is the locus of the effect—not merely the act of payment and receipt.
A complementary theological point: this very context indicates that the Prophet possesses a distinctive rank and power in the world—the capacity for “purification,” “spiritual purification,” and a “ṣalāt” that grants sakan. The verse places no temporal restriction on this station; therefore, the principle of seeking the Prophet’s intercession remains meaningful and justified. If the principle of the Prophet’s succession is likewise not subject to suspension, then the true successor must bear this same rank—a claim that, by the explicit testimony of both supporters and opponents, was not true of Abu Bakr. Hence, if Malik did not hand over zakāt to Abu Bakr, it was on this very basis: “your ṣalāt does not bring sakan.”
3.3 The Direct Connection to the Case of Malik ibn Nuwayra
If Malik returned the collected zakāt—with the understanding that its collection and effects were exclusive to the Prophet—this was not apostasy; it was interpretive reasoning. Sunni reports themselves also state that some remained Muslim and merely did not give zakāt to anyone other than the Prophet, arguing from this very verse; that is, the dispute concerned the legitimate authority to collect it, not the principle of zakāt itself. (See the citations in the previous section.)
3.4 Where Does Dehlawi’s Defense Slip?
Overlooking the true agent in the verse reduces the prophetic function of “taking/purifying/cleansing/bringing tranquility” (akhḏ/taṭhīr/tazkiya/sakan) to a subsequent administrative procedure, and from this constructs a ruling of apostasy; whereas this context does not admit such a judgment.
3.5 Juridical–Theological Conclusion
On the basis of this very reading, the “refusal of alms” in that setting can be an acceptable interpretation, rather than disbelief. (Abu Bakr himself had said: “He interpreted it and erred.” Thus, either there was no denial involved, or it did not warrant killing; both alternatives undermine the basis for exonerating Khalid and justifying the killing. (Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin))
Brief conclusion
The verse highlights prophetic agency in taking, purifying, cleansing, and bringing tranquility—matters dependent not on “property,” but on the “person of the Messenger.” By this criterion, Malik’s conduct was not a “denial of a religious necessity,” but a dispute over who possessed authority—and this is the coup de grâce to the claim of apostasy in this case.
Appeal to the Qur’an and the Prohibition of Killing
Sayyid Muhammad-Quli Kanturi poses a simple and decisive question: “In that case, how could the killing of Malik—who relied on the Qur’an—have been lawful?” How can one who invokes a verse in support of his action and advances a Qur’anic argument be deemed “an apostate whose killing is permissible”? If an explicit appeal to the Qur’an still leads to the sword, then where is there room for acting upon the Qur’an? (Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin, pp. 145–146)
“One Rule for One, Another for Another” in Justifying Ijtihad
Sayyid Muhammad-Quli Kanturi exposes a prevalent double standard: Ahl al-Sunna justify Muʿawiya’s and ʿAʾisha’s fighting against the Commander of the Faithful (ʿa) as “an error arising from doubt and ijtihad.” Thus, if—per impossibile—someone erred through “ijtihad” concerning zakat, why should the same leniency not extend to him? This “one rule for one, another for another” becomes still more stark when we recall that Malik neither offered a personal opinion nor resorted to analogy; he “argued from the Qur’an, not from his own opinion.” This alone undermines the very basis for attributing apostasy to him. (Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin, p. 146)
“For Ahl al-Sunna deem Muʿawiya’s and ʿAʾisha’s fighting against the noble Commander of the Faithful (ʿa) permissible on the grounds of doubt and an error of ijtihad; so if someone likewise denies the obligation of zakat through an error of ijtihad, what room is there for reproach?” (ibid.)
Contravening the Consensus Against Fighting Those Who Withheld Zakat: A Report of “Consensus”
Sayyid Muhammad-Quli Kanturi’s central point is this: fighting those who withheld zakat was reported to be contrary to the “consensus of the Muslims” at that time. Citing Ibn Abi al-Hadid’s transmission from al-Ṭabari, he writes: “The Muslims unanimously accepted the Arabs’ request to remit zakat; but Abu Bakr departed from this consensus and said that he would do what the Messenger of God had done and take what he had taken.” (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 17/208; transmitted from al-Ṭabari; cited in Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin, pp. 146–147)
In continuation of the same report, the recorded public consultation states: Abu Bakr sought the views of the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār concerning fighting; all remained silent for a time. Then Umar proposed that “their prayer be accepted and their zakāt be left aside,” because “they have only recently emerged from the Jāhiliyyah.” Uthman said the same; “Ali ibn Abi Talib, may God’s blessings be upon them both, likewise stated the same,” and the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār followed suit.
Sayyid Muhammad-Quli Kinturi’s conclusion: “From this report it is explicit and clear that Umar, Uthman, His Eminence the Commander of the Faithful, peace be upon him, and the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār all had consensus on refraining from fighting those who withheld zakāt.” (Kanz al-ʿUmmāl, under the consultation concerning fighting; cited in Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin, p. 147)
Summary of the Arguments of the Late Sayyid Muhammad-Quli Kinturi in Refutation of Tuḥfa-yi Ithnā ʿAshariyya
1) Mālik ibn Nuwayra relied on the Qur’anic verse in collecting/refusing alms; such reliance is not apostasy. 2) The double standard in “ijtihād”: if large-scale bloodshed is justified as an “error of ijtihād,” how can Mālik’s Qur’anic reasoning warrant his killing? 3) Fighting those who withheld zakāt, according to a report relied upon by Sunni authorities themselves, was contrary to the consensus of the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār; thus Abu Bakr’s action is supported not only by no “text,” but also lacks the declared basis of “consensus.” (Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin, pp. 145–147)
These three axes strengthen Sayyid Muhammad-Quli Kinturi’s argument: once “reliance on the Qur’an” was regarded as a crime, “blood-spilling ijtihād” was exonerated, and the “consensus of the time” was ignored, this case can no longer be framed as a “legitimate conquest.” This is precisely the point at which the article’s proof concerning “the rational necessity of infallibility in the Imamate” moves from theory into the field of history, demonstrating that preferring analogy and the expediency of power over text and justice leads to the institutionalization of error and crime.
The practical conclusion against Abu Bakr arising from this discussion is clear: dispatching Khālid to fight a group from whom clear signs of Islam had been observed resulted in the “killing of a protected soul,” “the destruction of a Muslim tribe,” and “the violation of women’s honor”; and, in terms of political and religious responsibility, these consequences fall directly upon Abu Bakr. Beyond the criminal nature of the event, the very decision itself—according to reports relied upon by Sunni authorities—was contrary to the “consensus of the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār,” the very consensus that opponents regard as proof and whose violation they deem a departure from religion. Therefore, Abu Bakr is answerable both for the “act itself” and for the “method of decision-making”; the combination of these two intensifies the indictment and fundamentally destabilizes the claimed legitimacy of his caliphate. (Tashyīd al-Maṭāʿin, pp. 146–147; see also: Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, 17/208)
Contrary to the consensus concerning fighting those who withheld zakat: following the apostasy or refusal of certain tribes to pay zakat, consultations took place among the Muhajirun and the Ansar. According to Ibn Abi al-Hadid’s report from al-Tabari’s History, the prevailing view among the Companions was that, at this juncture, accepting their prayer and refraining from immediately enforcing zakat was preferable, so that faith might become established in their hearts. Abu Bakr, however, disagreed and insisted on implementing the same practice of collecting zakat followed during the Prophet’s era (PBUH). This report indicates that the “word of the Muslims” had united in accepting the Arabs’ request—regarding the suspension of zakat collection—whereas Abu Bakr departed from this consensus. (Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah of Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 17/208, citing Tarikh al-Tabari) Other reports convey the same meaning: it is narrated from Umar that, during the apostasy of the Arabs, the view of the Muhajirun—including himself—was that, for the time being, prayer should suffice and the enforcement of zakat should be postponed. Their reasoning was that if faith took root in their hearts, they themselves would acknowledge zakat. (Kanz al-Ummal, vol. 5, pp. 141–142, Mu’assasat al-Risalah ed., Beirut)
The contradiction in judging Khalid and its implications: remarkably, Abu Bakr explicitly acknowledges Khalid’s error on the one hand, yet calls him “correct” on the other. To judge him “correct” after admitting his “error” is in fact to endorse that very error and, in terms of its implications, entails repudiating the initial judgment and even declaring him sinful anew. Even if someone suspends judgment on the original incident and says that this account requires reflection, the answer is clear: either retaliation for homicide and the punishment for adultery become incumbent upon Khalid (according to the import of the act committed), or, if it is said that they do not, this entails accepting Umar’s falsehood and sinfulness in his contrary testimony. In either case, the final judgment works against the decision-making establishment of the time and demonstrates the usurping nature of the caliphate of the first rulers. (Tashyid al-Mata'in, pp. 146–147; Kanz al-Ummal, vol. 5, pp. 141–142)
Conclusion
This study has shown that, in the case of Malik ibn Nuwayrah, on the basis of Qur’an 9:103 of Surat al-Tawbah, his conduct was not “withholding zakat” in the sense of denying the underlying ruling. Rather, the dispute concerned the legitimate authority for collecting it and the relation of “Take/Pray/Tranquillity” (khudh/salli/sakan) to prophetic agency. A rereading of intra-Sunni reports—from Fakhr al-Razi, al-Qastallani, and others—made clear that the two forms of “returning alms”—local distribution among the poor of the same people, or returning them to the zakat-payers on the understanding that “collection is exclusively the Messenger’s (PBUH)”—fall within the sphere of a defensible interpretation and are not a denial of zakat. Accordingly, attributing “apostasy” to Malik lacks reliable support.
On the other hand, the decision to fight and kill, in circumstances where Qur’anic evidence and authoritative interpretations offered grounds for construing the other party’s conduct, is incompatible with the standards of justice and caution regarding Muslim lives. The tension between “text” and “analogy” in post-textual judgment, as well as contemporary reports regarding an inclination toward forbearance and acceptance of the prayers of those withholding zakat, further diminishes the argumentative weight of the decision to fight. Taken together, these considerations underscore the political and religious responsibility of the decision-makers and executors.
The article’s analytical conclusion is this: neither the claim of Malik ibn Nuwayrah’s apostasy is acceptable, nor is a general campaign of fighting on that basis justified. Consequently, his killers—and those who supported this decision—have compromised their fitness for the caliphate and governance of the Muslims by transgressing the bounds of justice and disregarding the requirement of the text. This case constitutes historical evidence for the study’s general claim: whenever religious-political authority departs from the criterion of infallibility and adherence to the text, justice is surrendered to power’s expedient-making and public rights are harmed. Therefore, a return to text-centered and justice-oriented judgment is not merely a theological stance, but a necessity for safeguarding the lives and dignity of the community of believers.
